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Urban conflict in Syria has had devastating impacts 
on besieged civilians targeted by deliberate bombing 
and human rights abuses. Local actors, some with an 
overt humanitarian mandate, engage in first response 
activities, but often lack sufficient training, equipment 
and operationalisation. Our research from four 
besieged urban areas finds a range of capabilities, 
understandings and mandates within six different 
sets of organisations involved in first response. Our 
mixed-methods research methodology points to a 
strong evidence-base of the needs and strengths of 
organisations undertaking first response, and how 
external agencies can better support them. 
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Executive summary
Urban humanitarian crises are increasing. Recent 
conflicts in Ukraine, Libya, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere 
indicate a growing need to improve humanitarian 
programming, especially in urban areas where the 
bulk of fighting has occurred, and greater engagement 
with local first responders and a diverse range of other 
actors. This research project brought together NGOs, 
civil society and academics to undertake collaborative 
data gathering and analysis to investigate urban conflict 
response mechanisms. The research plan was designed 
in response to challenges identified by partners in major 
urban conflict zones in Syria experiencing prolonged 
and repeated bombardments, attacks and logistical 
challenges, where international humanitarian actors have 
very limited ground presence or influence.
This working paper documents and investigates 
perceptions of actors engaged in first response and 
civilian protection practices, and their capacities in 
opposition-held urban areas of Syria, with conclusions 
and recommendations for urban conflict actors 
globally. It presents an overview of the capabilities, 
shortcomings, opportunities and major challenges 
facing first responders in their own words. The 
conclusions are based on primary data gathered from 
first response actors in Aleppo and three other urban 
areas under siege by government armed forces and 
their allies. 
This paper adopts a broad definition of ‘protection’ 
that refers to immediate emergency activities pre- and 
post- bombing, as well as legal and human rights 
legislation and compliance. This is partly because the 
term is more widely understood than ‘first response’ 
and covers preparedness and planning measures. It 
also avoids the sociocultural distinctions of sub-groups 
requiring specific protection measures, such as women, 
the elderly or children, which are understood in very 
diverse ways by different stakeholders. While the 
bulk of the stakeholders’ activities are more related to 
first response, we have used ‘civilian protection’ as a 
comprehensive term that encapsulates various activities 
and mandates.
The research finds that organisations and individuals 
engage in what can be loosely termed civilian protection 
of some type, without necessarily being aware of how 
this links to international norms and practices or even 
perceiving themselves as doing protection work.
There is virtually no indication of familiarity with any 
international frameworks, conventions or policies on 
civilian protection. The Syria case is pertinent due 
to the absence of international observers, severity of 
civilian casualties by state and opposition forces, and 
the emergence of home-grown first responders. Many 
first response actors see their work as a natural, even 
inevitable reaction to the horrors of urban warfare 
and appear to be motivated by humanitarian and 
empathetic ideals, often marked by self-sacrifice, 
disregard for personal safety, and fatalism. In these 
urban conflict environments, a diverse, educated 
and motivated populace includes a wide range of 
protection stakeholders, comprising varying levels of 
professionalism, attitudes, capacities and aims. Some 
are motivated by faith, others by a sense of civic duty. 
Some are paid, and others are volunteers. Some have 
explicit protection mandates, and others are only 
tangentially engaged in protection activities. Six main 
groups of first response stakeholders emerged during 
our investigation:
1. White Helmets (Syrian Civil Defence): the most 
prominent first responder group in opposition areas 
of Syria, with an overt protection mandate and strong 
legitimacy. 
2. Medical professionals: their first response 
capacities extend to medical treatment of conflict 
victims, focusing on emergency life-saving 
interventions under very constrained operating 
environments.
3. Free Syrian Police: established in 2013 with 
support from the UK government, and operating in 
Aleppo, Idlib and Daraa provinces; their mandate 
has been compromised by opposition forces and 
their role in rebel-held areas has been left somewhat 
unclear. For first response, they coordinate most 
closely with the White Helmets.
4. Local councils: offices of the Syrian interim 
government, they have a significant role in service 
provision and care of civilians, extending to 
basic amenities and communication with other 
stakeholders in opposition areas. While first 
response is not their primary mandate, they are 
heavily involved in supporting hospitals and schools 
and acting as an overarching coordinating body.
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5. Local NGOs: these represent a variety of 
organisations, comprising community groups, faith 
groups, voluntary bodies, and local humanitarian 
agencies.
6. Opposition first responders: this group includes 
forces with varying levels of interest and engagement 
in first response and it is difficult to ascertain 
precisely their protection activities. Some are more 
overtly involved in first response and protection than 
others, partly as a method to secure local support 
and establish legitimacy.
This paper does not distinguish human rights violations 
or war crimes carried out by the regime from those 
committed by other armed factions. We do not 
investigate solutions to the conflict or allocate blame, 
and we are concerned only with aspects of first 
response and civilian protection. None of the interview 
and survey questions posed to respondents enquired 
about ceasefires, terminating the conflict, negotiated 
settlements or peace agreements. All the questions 
relate only to protection and first response issues, the 
operational environment of the respondents and their 
recommendations for improving work activities and 
other changes they would like to see. However, it was 
often difficult to limit interviewees and focus group 
discussants, particularly if they wished to speak freely 
and open up about various challenges of working and 
living under siege. This was particularly the case for the 
opposition groups who assist with first response.
The findings suggest increasing remote support to 
organisations working in first response and encouraging 
a move away from ad hoc approaches towards more 
professionalism and standardisation that incorporate 
better preparedness and mitigation measures in 
addition to response.
The following are recommendations to improve external 
support for civilian protection:
• Develop more inclusive ways to relate international 
protection norms and frameworks and build a 
closer engagement with local actors and their 
understandings, activities and capabilities.
• Extend guidance and information within international 
humanitarian law and other binding frameworks to 
operationalise first response activities with a focus on 
ground-level governance, coordination and capacities.
• Widen the narrative on what constitutes ‘humanitarian’ 
response, focusing firstly on local capabilities and 
how international actors can support these, not the 
other way round. 
• Adopt more inclusive mechanisms that integrate 
a larger set of first response actors and other 
stakeholders involved in civilian protection.
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1 
Background to the 
research project
1.1 Operational 
environment 
The conflict in Syria is catastrophic. The numbers of 
casualties, the duration of the civil war, the horrific 
targeting of civilians, the use of torture and of proscribed 
weapons position this conflict as a case study for 
the worst violence in modern times and highlight the 
inability of formal political mechanisms to halt it. The 
exact numbers of casualties are highly disputed, and 
it is difficult to distinguish civilian and combatant 
deaths. There are no universally accepted numbers 
of casualties, torture victims, extra-judicial killings, or 
numbers of female or child victims. Both regime forces 
and opposition forces are accused of lying about 
casualty numbers and claiming combatants as civilians. 
Whichever figures are accepted, the massive numbers 
of people in humanitarian need, IDPs, refugees, and 
overall fatalities, all serve to emphasise the incredibly 
challenging work environment for first responders and 
other humanitarian actors. The organisations below 
have reported the following numbers of casualties and 
displaced peoples:
• The Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) claims 
a total death toll of 470,000 (up to February 2016) 
(SCPR, 11 February 2016).
• The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) 
estimates from 321,000 to 465,000 total casualties 
(March 2011 to March 2017) and more than 14 million 
wounded and displaced (SOHR, 13 March 2017).
• Staffan de Mistura, the UN and Arab League Envoy 
to Syria, estimates total casualties of 400,000 (March 
2011 to April 2016) (Foreign Policy, 22 April 2016).
• The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) 
reports that the civilian death toll alone has reached 
207,000 (SNHR, 18 March 2017).
• The UNHCR has registered over 5 million refugees 
(June 2017) with the majority in Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey (Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, n.d.).
• Syria currently has the biggest internally displaced 
population in the world: 6.5 million people, including 
2.8 million children (UNHCR, n.d.).
• 13.5 million people require humanitarian assistance 
(UNOCHA, n.d.).
The Syria conflict is characterised by the immense 
suffering of civilians: the deliberate targeting of 
humanitarian actors, blocking or destruction of 
humanitarian supply convoys, human rights abuses, 
mass killings, gang rapes, torture and use of proscribed 
weaponry. Siege warfare violates many different treaties 
on human rights and international humanitarian law. 
Numerous competing armed groups, both insurgents 
and pro-government, shifting alliances, and multiple 
international actors who have failed to agree on a 
strategy all complicate the conflict environment and 
humanitarian provision. Aleppo was one of the major 
urban areas contested by the regime and rebel groups 
and has been devastated by indiscriminate shelling, 
airstrikes and bombing. Many inhabitants have fled, and 
IIED WorkIng papEr
   www.iied.org     9
the remaining suffer massive risks and deprivations. 
During the course of our data collection from May 2016 
to January 2017, opposition-held neighbourhoods of 
Aleppo were recaptured by the regime.
This research relates specifically to urban areas of Syria 
where the bulk of the fighting has occurred, and where 
siege conditions have been most severe. However, large 
numbers of displaced civilians also reside in rural areas. 
Blocked roads, absence of basic services and denial 
of humanitarian access are defining characteristics of 
the Syrian civil war. Organisations such as the White 
Helmets emerged in urban areas alongside other 
service providers operating in cities, such as hospital 
staff and local interim councils. Some of the elements 
discussed in this paper also relate to rural areas and 
to humanitarian protection in general, but we focus on 
urban siege environments and the actors operating 
within them.
All parties to armed conflict must ensure that civilians 
are protected. This is enshrined in international 
humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols. Attacks may only be directed 
against combatants and are forbidden against civilians 
(ICRC, n.d.a) unless they take up arms (ICRC, n.d.b). 
Humanitarian access and free movement of civilians 
must be maintained. However, recent conflicts in 
Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Iraq, and elsewhere experience 
deliberate targeting of civilians. There is a growing need 
to both improve adherence to civilian protection and 
strengthen capacities of local first responders. This 
research brought together NGOs, civil society and 
scholars to investigate first response practices and 
shortcomings in Syrian urban conflict. The project was 
designed in response to challenges previously identified 
by partners involved in civilian protection and other 
humanitarian efforts.
Guidelines, strategy papers and policy 
recommendations on urban civilian protection exist 
(GAUC, 2016a; 2016b), as well as legal frameworks 
and UN Resolutions (Geneva Convention IV, 1949 
(ICRC, n.d.c); UNSC, 2006). The most relevant to our 
research are international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
international human rights law (IHRL), with the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee’s report (IASC, n.d.) on 
urban humanitarian challenges also relevant.
Current challenges to civilian protection are not the 
result of weak institutions or laws, but a failure to comply 
with them or access accurate information on how they 
are operationalised. Armed groups may not be familiar 
with these institutions and laws, consider them to be 
less important than winning the conflict, or consciously 
target civilians. Awareness of protection responsibilities, 
and non-combatants’ rights in conflict, remain weak 
among armed factions, both state and non-state. Issues 
of sovereignty and political neutrality are significant 
constraining factors, highly pertinent in the Syrian 
conflict. Despite the United Nations Security Council’s 
“outrage that civilians continue to account for the vast 
majority of casualties in situations of armed conflict” 
(UNSC, 2015), international policies and strategies 
are failing to sufficiently constrain violations. There 
are weaknesses in the support mechanisms to civilian 
protection actors, a lack of awareness of combatants’ 
responsibilities and civilian entitlements in conflict, and 
shortcomings in first response procedures. 
Our research situates ‘first response’ within a broader 
set of civilian protection activities: first aid, search 
& rescue, evacuation, early warning, triage, medical 
assistance, and promoting legal compliance. The civil 
defence in Syrian opposition areas, known as the ‘White 
Helmets’, are the most visible first responders, but 
our investigations also found large numbers of LNGO 
workers, medical personnel, interim government staff, 
and volunteers working in protection and first response. 
What also emerges from this investigation are numerous 
and repeated references by respondents to war crimes: 
use of proscribed weapons including gas, targeting of 
civilians and non-military targets, deliberate withholding 
of basic foodstuffs, and closure of humanitarian access.
We prefer the more neutral term ‘opposition-held 
areas’ over ‘liberated’ areas; the latter is a much more 
politically-loaded term and carries implications of 
freedom from the regime that we are not in a position to 
evaluate. Likewise, we refer to armed groups in conflict 
with the state as ‘opposition’ fighters or actors, rather 
than ‘martyrs’ or ‘freedom fighters’. However, when 
reporting the feedback from research respondents, 
we directly use the terms they employ. It should be 
understood that the use of politically-sensitive terms 
does not imply we endorse them.
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1.2 Formation of Syria’s 
Civil Defence
In early 2013, Syrian volunteers, led by founder Raed 
al-Saleh and supported by Mayday Rescue,1 established 
the civil defence units in response to bombing 
raids that targeted civilians in various urban centres 
across the country. By late 2014, the Syrian Civil 
Defence was formally established and various teams 
working separately came together under one national 
organisation, also known as the White Helmets.2 They 
currently number over 3,000 volunteers and claim 
to have saved around 95,000 lives to date, with 191 
recorded deaths among the White Helmets. They were 
nominated for the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize, and the 
Right Livelihood Award Foundation awarded them the 
‘alternative Nobel Prize’ for their “outstanding bravery, 
compassion and humanitarian engagement in rescuing 
civilians” (Right Livelihood Award, 23 February 2017). 
A film named ‘White Helmets’, based on the Syrian 
Civil Defence work, won an Oscar for best short 
documentary in February 2017. It is likely that the civil 
defence humanitarian ethos and work practices have 
had an influence on other organisations in Syria. 
The organisation’s modus operandi was quickly 
established: unarmed and politically neutral 
humanitarians who hurry to the scene of an attack 
and attempt to protect people on the ground from 
the effects of bombs and prevent further injury. Their 
work primarily consists of urban search and rescue 
(S&R), early warning, evacuation, first aid, firefighting, 
marking unexploded ordinance (UXOs), and so on. 
Video footage and photos of their work show them 
freeing people from rubble, triage activities, and dead 
body management. They face barrel bombs, sometimes 
containing chlorine, which frequently land on civilian 
targets such as schools, houses and hospitals. From 
2014, barrel bombs and other indiscriminate weapons 
have been banned by UN Security Council Resolution 
2139, yet they continue to be used heavily across Syria. 
Likewise, the UNSC banned chlorine as a weapon in 
2015, but that has not prevented its use there. 
Since the start of the civil war, Syria has been heavily 
influenced by the religious ideologies of extremists from 
various parts of the globe, yet the civil defence pledge is 
entirely non-sectarian: 
“I pledge to fulfil all missions which will be entrusted 
to me in the spirit of the fundamental values of 
civil defence which are neutrality, impartiality and 
humanity”. 
The civil defence claim to adhere to Protocol I of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (ICRC, n.d.c), and 
thus in accordance with international humanitarian 
norms. They function only in opposition areas and 
have no presence in regime-held territory. This has led 
to some accusations of collaboration with extremist 
and sectarian organisations, although the White 
Helmets maintain their non-affiliation. While these 
civil defence units claim to be neutral and impartial 
and not connected to any armed groups or political 
parties, there have been suggestions that they work 
with terrorist groups, for example Jabhat al-Nusra 
(Al-Qaeda in Syria), Islamic State, Jaysh al-Islam and 
Ahrar al-Sham. President Bashar Assad explicitly 
claims the White Helmets are part of Al Qaeda and 
that they operate as a front for Islamic extremism, 
while simultaneously maintaining that they are a tool of 
Western governments from whom they receive funding. 
This paper does not seek to establish the veracity of any 
of these accusations, only to clarify that the civil defence 
units operate solely in opposition areas, and those 
groups fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime comprise 
numerous and competing ideologies and affiliations. As 
we see in Chapter 4, several first responders mention 
the need to coordinate with armed opposition groups 
while claiming to be ideologically unaffiliated. 
1.3 Justification for the 
research
The conflict environment is extremely complex. Many 
non-state groups are engaged in the civil war, in 
addition to the Syrian regime and the Russians. There 
is a complex and shifting set of rebel groups and 
alliances, some of whom are supported externally, 
and some of whom are also involved in fighting 
international coalitions. This has compounded the 
challenges of ensuring IHL compliance and delivering 
humanitarian services, and presents major difficulties for 
conflict cessation.
Civilians are forced to adapt to a daily environment 
of massive insecurity and multiple threats, and 
consequently vulnerabilities are inherent in their 
mitigation strategies and coping practices. Key dangers 
include bombing of buildings, unexploded ordinance, 
fires, and structural instability of larger buildings affected 
by explosives, but also interrupted communications 
and roadblocks and lack of food, clean water, medical 
equipment, medicines and transport. These shortages 
severely hamper S&R and triage activities and often 
result in additional casualties. Civil defence and other 
local first response actors claim to receive insufficient 
support and capacity building to strengthen their 
preparedness and response mechanisms.
1 www.maydayrescue.org/
2 www.whitehelmets.org/en
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For civilian protection, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
and Afaq Academy previously carried out data collection 
for their ‘Conflict Preparedness and Protection’ (CPP) 
programme in Syria (see Annex 5). The data collection 
for the CPP provided an overview of behaviours 
and knowledge of civilians on how best to protect 
themselves before, during and after bombing attacks, 
on Mine Risk Education (MRE) and perceptions of risk, 
support and other information relevant to civilian [self] 
protection in urban siege (CPUS).
The current CPUS research project was designed 
to provide similar data, but focus on first responders, 
rather than civilians. The research faced severe 
difficulties of translation, insecurity and remote 
supervision, as well as the challenges of conveying to 
busy and stressed respondents the nuances between 
the various terms and practices. Local organisations 
responding to extreme violence suffer from lack of 
capacity and opportunities for critically assessing their 
activities, and are prevented from sharing best practice 
and theory on civilian protection in urban sieges. This 
research intended to uncover what practices and 
strategies first responders currently employ and the 
needs and possible improvements they identify. 
There are no formally agreed definitions of ‘urban’. 
Regarding what constitutes ‘urban’ in this paper, rather 
than merely a conglomeration of buildings or densely 
inhabited areas, it refers to “a context that considers 
the complex and interacting social pressures together 
with the essential services on which most people 
rely… Population or area-based definitions of ‘urban’ 
are inadequate” (ICRC, 2015:17). It is recognised that 
there are strong links between rural and urban, such 
that roadblocks and other disruptions to transport 
in remote areas can have significant impacts on 
urban populations.
1.4 Objectives of the 
research
This research seeks to establish a baseline of current 
practice and the perceived gaps in urban conflict 
first response to inform international actors, donors, 
humanitarian programming and funding architecture. It 
does this by:
• Investigating current practices, capacities and 
coordination of local actors in civilian protection in 
urban siege locations
• Examining the challenges facing first responders and 
uncovering their needs in terms of training, equipment, 
and governance
• Investigating how the international community (donors, 
NGOs, governments, international organisations) 
can strengthen support to local first response and 
protection actors, and 
• Informing subsequent programming and research 
priorities for humanitarian agencies, donors, and 
researchers.
This project does not seek to evaluate people’s work, 
but to present their lived experiences and their own 
perception of the operational environment and what 
additional support they request. What emerges is 
not just an overview of first response work practices, 
challenges, and enabling factors, but also an insight 
into life in urban siege, people’s perceptions and 
experiences under bombardment, and how they try to 
continue some semblance of everyday life amidst the 
destruction and death.
1.5 Policy relevance
The United Nations Security Council has passed 
several resolutions relevant to civilian protection, such 
as Resolution 2286 in 2016, condemning deliberate 
attacks on health facilities and medical and humanitarian 
providers and reaffirming the responsibility of the 
state to protect all people under its territory. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross in late 
2016 urged all parties to the Syrian conflict to protect 
civilians and follow “the basic rules of warfare, and of 
humanity” (ICRC, 2016). The European Commission’s 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department 
(ECHO, 2017) calls for an end to attacks on civilians 
in Syria and full implementation of the norms of 
international humanitarian law (IHL). The European 
Union in March 2017 issued a Joint Communication 
(EUAS, 2017) demanding all parties ensure the 
protection of civilians and recognising the almost daily 
violation of IHL which includes repeated and deliberate 
attacks on civilian infrastructure: health, education, 
water, and so on.
Despite frequent public denunciations by the 
international community of the horrific scale of civilian 
casualties in Syria, the fact is that attacks on non-
combatants by many different armed groups remain a 
defining feature of this civil war. Declarations and calls 
from the UN, EC, and other bodies have not had any 
discernible impact on conflict behaviours on the ground. 
For the narrow purposes of CPUS research, this 
complete lack of compliance has several implications:
• Policies and frameworks developed and refined 
since the Second World War to ensure protection 
behaviours in conflict may no longer be an adequate 
response to modern civil warfare
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• The agencies tasked with promoting IHL, civilian 
protection, human rights and other humanitarian 
principles face severe obstacles if mechanisms to 
enforce these policies are either not implemented or 
are meaningless without military interventions
• The locus of responsibility for protection therefore 
falls to civilians themselves (hence NPA’s Conflict 
Preparedness and Protection initiative and other 
humanitarian interventions), and
• In the absence of international enforcement, domestic 
agencies may take on these responsibilities when 
faced with state and non-state abuses of humanitarian 
principles.
In 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit called for local 
and national actors to be at the forefront of humanitarian 
responses and the need for greater localisation of aid. 
Likewise, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) seeks to improve the 
effectiveness of aid and to promote peer learning. The 
Global Alliance for Urban Crises (GAUC) emerged 
from the World Humanitarian Summit and is committed 
to local leadership, participation of affected people 
and local knowledge that leads to improved bottom-up 
approaches that mobilise available partnerships and 
resources (GAUC, 2016a). It calls for the protection 
of the most vulnerable and promotes ‘resilience’ as a 
key factor in urban crisis preparedness. As far back 
as 2002, the UN highlighted the need for better 
efficiency and effectiveness in urban S&R, and the 
responsibility of states to protect S&R teams operating 
in their territory.
In line with these priorities, this paper promotes the 
protection mandate of various first responder groups, 
and calls for a greater recognition of their efforts and 
the challenges under which they operate, and improved 
mechanisms for learning and sharing of best practices.
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2 
Methodology
2.1 Project implementation
The composition of our research consortium reflects 
the challenges of obtaining reliable and valid data from 
complex emergency urban environments suffering 
repeated bombings and violence, with multiple and 
competing conflict actors. Such research is only 
possible using previously established coordination 
channels with critical levels of inter-agency trust. The 
partner on the ground in Syria, Afaq Academy, acted 
as a ‘gatekeeper’ to source information from first 
responders. This data was transferred to NPA field 
office in Gaziantep, Turkey, who assisted with translation 
and conveyed relevant data to CTPSR in Coventry, UK. 
The research featured low-tech and robust methods: 
interviews, surveys and focus group discussions 
(FGDs). This mixed methods approach produced both 
‘rich’ qualitative and statistical data from inside Syria 
that facilitated a comparative learning process, whereby 
the three partners shared findings and impressions 
with each other. As the local partner in Syria, Afaq 
played a significant role in shaping the investigations 
and the project approach was reflexive to incorporate 
their concerns, priorities and previous experiences. 
Afaq Academy was the main data collection partner for 
NPA’s previous Conflict Preparedness and Protection 
(CPP) project.
The management of the project posed particular 
challenges of coordination and reporting. Afaq 
Academy staff in Syria undertook the data collection 
from a variety of humanitarian first responders and were 
monitored and supported by local project coordinators. 
The respondents included people working directly in 
response to bombing of civilian areas, but also those 
engaging with a wider range of emergency scenarios. 
The respondents included some administrative, 
communications and financial support staff, as well as 
managers and supervisors. As much as was possible, 
the researchers endeavoured to interview the most 
senior person in any given office or centre. 
2.2 Project coordination
1. Afaq researchers gather data in opposition-held 
territories in Syria.
2. They report to the Afaq Local Project Coordinator, 
based in Gaziantep.
3. Afaq activities are supported by NPA, from 
Gaziantep.
4. NPA shares information with Coventry University.
5. Coventry produce deliverables, liaise with partners 
and the donor and publish.
6. The end-of-project multi-stakeholder workshop in 
Gaziantep, Turkey allowed for critical feedback on 
our initial findings.
7. All outputs shared with NPA and Afaq before 
submission to the funder.
To prepare the research teams and improve 
standardisation of data collection, the project started 
with a workshop in Gaziantep, Turkey which brought 
together the three partners to discuss project 
parameters and the specific questions to be asked 
in the survey, the interviews and the focus groups. 
We discussed project ethics, anonymity, staff safety, 
confidentiality and other issues. There was training and 
discussion on research methodologies, participatory 
project implementation, reporting requirements and 
standardisation of data collection. 
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The data collection was weaker in the early parts of the 
project. The researchers failed to sufficiently ask follow-
up questions or probe information from the respondents 
and so the first few interviews are consequently much 
less detailed. Though a careful process of remote 
capacity building and support in interview techniques 
and understanding the purpose of an interview (how 
it differs from survey questions, for example), we 
were able to improve the quality and detail of the 
subsequent interviews.
However, the data collected through the surveys was of 
excellent quality from the beginning, partly due to Afaq’s 
previous survey experience. We had developed a mix 
of closed and open-ended questions (see Annex 4) 
which were discussed in detail and decided on during 
the initial project workshop. Although our research 
could only complete 529 surveys, the richness of the 
final data compensated for this. For example, four of the 
questions featured three-stage answers and hence gave 
a significant amount of additional information.
Staff displacement and turnover, hibernation and 
displacement were continuous hindrances to the 
research, reducing the continuity of the data collection. 
However, in the second half of the project and the arrival 
of some new researchers, the richness of the data 
increased, the interviews became of higher quality and 
more insightful, and the standard of the translation from 
Arabic into English was improved.
By late 2016, the worsening security in Aleppo in 
particular forced an end to data collection. We received 
a series of insider reports detailing the bombardment 
of civilian areas and the encroachment of regime forces 
and its allies which forced us to abandon the research. 
There was also a total lack of electricity and internet 
connection which prevented any further uploading of 
project data. All the research staff were advised to take 
any necessary action to ensure their safety; to flee, hide, 
or relocate as they saw fit. They allocated themselves 
refuge locations for reach of the data collection sites. 
There was no paperwork from the project, and the hand-
held devices could easily have their memories wiped 
clean. No record remained in Syria of the work carried 
out. All the data was transferred to partners in UK and 
Turkey. This final transfer of data out of Syria took many 
weeks due to insecurity, staff displacement and lack of 
communications. The project partners agreed to follow 
a zero-communications protocol and staff were free to 
take any and all measures that they saw fit to ensure 
their safety. None of the researchers were injured or 
went missing.
2.3 Translation issues
This project experienced numerous challenges due 
to working across two languages. All survey and 
interview questions were written first in English, and 
then converted into Arabic. Likewise, all respondent 
data was given in Arabic and had to be converted into 
English. This translation work was carried out by various 
individuals in different locations and at different times, 
with little or no direct contact with each other. Not 
all translators were Syrian. All quoted material in this 
paper comes directly verbatim from the translations and 
has not been adapted into more formal grammatically 
correct English. All direct quotations are in italics.
2.4 Data collection
This data collection combines qualitative interviews and 
focus groups, with quantitative surveys.
• Interviews (N=24)
 – Civil defence including managers, operations teams 
members (N=3)
 – Medical providers: senior administrative staff as 
well as nurses and doctors (N=12)
 – Local council staff (N=4)
 – Local NGO staff (N=3)
 – Opposition forces (N=2)
 – Free police (N=0)
• Focus group discussions (N=11)
 – Civil defence (N=4)
 – Medical providers (N=3
 – Local council staff (N=2
 – Local NGO staff (N=2)
 – Opposition forces (N=0)
 – Free police (N=0)
The focus groups tended to comprise multiple 
colleagues from the same organisation, rather than 
representatives from different organisations, which 
seemed to be too challenging and insecure to organise. 
These were normally facilitated by more than one CPUS 
researcher simultaneously. It was not desirable to hold 
group discussions with opposition forces, and the 
free police were not available as a group. We did not 
investigate if any individuals were a member of more 
than one group.
• Surveys (N=529)
 – Civil defence units (N=101)
 – Medical providers (N=104)
 – Local NGOs (N=131)
 – Local interim government councils (N=80)
 – Opposition groups (N=92)
 – Free police (N=21)
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The CPUS researchers were severely constrained 
in terms of who they could meet, and for what length 
of time. Respondents were understandably cautious 
about face-to-face meetings, who would be using 
the data, and for what purpose. The researchers’ 
sampling approach therefore tended to rely on personal 
introductions and references to the previous data 
collection they had done with NPA, which focused 
on civilian attitudes and practices in urban siege. 
Respondents then often nominated other colleagues 
who might be willing to provide information, and gave a 
recommendation for the CPUS researchers. On other 
occasions, the data collection relied on ‘cold calling’, 
whereby the researchers visited a health centre or 
office of the White Helmets and asked to speak to 
anyone who could make time. In most cases, they were 
requested to return at a more appropriate time.
The research team often found it easier to make 
contact with and meet medical providers than civil 
defence staff, which reflects the work environment and 
available time. Many of the interviews and focus group 
notes feature additional informal observations taken 
by CPUS researchers, but the planned ethnographic 
elements of the data collection remained at a basic 
level. Our teams reported that respondents became 
uncomfortable and even confrontational if they thought 
the researchers were making notes about them. Afaq 
Academy advised us that such data collection methods 
were not well-known in Syria, particularly under 
these highly sensitive conditions, and that it would 
be better to abandon attempts to record researcher 
observations. The interviews and group discussions 
were designed for more senior individuals – managers, 
team leaders, and government representatives. It 
proved extremely difficult to fulfil the intended number 
of interviews, purely because of the time demands on 
individual respondents.
The surveys were aimed at more junior workers and 
volunteers. Our surveys comprise 20 closed and open 
ended questions and were answered anonymously by 
455 men and 74 women (total 529) involved in civilian 
protection in Syria. Most of the data was collected in 
Aleppo, and followed by East Ghouta. A lesser amount 
of data was gathered in Madaya and Darayya. 
2.5 Confidentiality
All respondents were given the choice of how 
much personal data to supply. Totally anonymous 
and untraceable were given as the default options. 
Respondents could select whether to divulge 
organisational affiliation, job title, professional 
qualifications, length of time in post, and main 
responsibilities. They were offered the option to 
withhold any information, refuse to answer any 
questions, and request to withdraw from the project in 
which case all records and references to that person 
would be deleted. All respondents are professionals or 
volunteers working with or associated with professional 
bodies. No civilians were contacted in this project, and 
nobody under the age of 18. 
A ‘Participant Information Sheet’ was offered to each 
respondent, or potential respondent, containing 
information about the scope and intentions of the 
project, and the possibility to remove themselves 
completely from it. We did not hear of any respondents 
refusing to take part in an interview, but in several 
locations, the staff refused to participate in a focus 
group discussion, stating they were too busy. 
Much of this type of research is unprecedented. 
It is rare to be able to undertake data collection in 
battlefield conditions. 
2.6 Objectivity and 
research biases
Data gathering under these conditions cannot be 
as rigorous and structured as we would have liked. 
Under such conditions and lacking the field support 
and oversight that we would have preferred, we had 
to sacrifice some research rigour, as staff safety was 
paramount. For example, all the field researchers and 
all the respondents were based in opposition-held 
territory where various armed rebel groups fight each 
other and against Assad’s government. What was 
originally a revolutionary struggle against Assad’s 
regime was hijacked by armed groups motivated by 
religious extremism, nationalism or criminality. The 
operating environment where this research was carried 
out, in addition to the massive insecurity and human 
rights abuses, was characterised by various factions, 
terrorists, mercenaries and external groups competing 
for power and influence. Staff from NPA or Coventry 
University cannot visit such locations to directly support 
the researchers, check the reliability of collected data 
or carry out triangulation procedures. Even day-to-day 
monitoring of project activities is problematic when the 
first message given to researchers is above all to look 
after their own safety. Another challenge was the high 
turnover of researchers, and while the management 
team tried to ensure continuity and standardisation, 
we had to repeatedly give training and support to new 
staff, often over the phone from Gaziantep or by email. 
There are significant disadvantages in trying to manage 
a research project under such conditions and the whole 
data collection and analysis process risks becoming 
less rigorous.
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Respondents were understandably unwilling to be 
photographed or recorded, and would not give written 
consent, only verbal. Our own researchers only 
recorded their first names for the interviews and surveys 
so they cannot be traced. Likewise, the detail varies 
between researchers in terms of what they recorded 
of interview location, respondent job title and other 
background information. This has compounded the 
difficulties of establishing a fully structured coding 
system for the interviews and focus groups.
Working to strengthen the confidence and research 
capacity of the Afaq Academy staff while inside 
opposition-held territory posed many difficulties. 
We endeavoured to provide what training we could 
from Turkey and the UK, such as how to improve 
interview techniques and gather more relevant data 
from respondents. This meant that while the quality 
of interviews improved, the researchers sometimes 
asked additional questions, not all of which were 
related to first response or protection issues. We were 
pleased to witness the researchers developing their 
confidence and scope, but had to encourage them 
to avoid questions relating to causes of the conflict 
or mechanisms to end it. Much as the aim of the data 
collection was to focus on civilian protection and first 
response issues, respondents took the opportunity 
to converse on a variety of wider topics, and the 
researchers sometimes had difficulty keeping them to a 
narrow topic of conversation.
We established some mitigating factors to address 
the above challenges and improve the reliability of the 
findings. Firstly, NPA and Afaq Academy have worked 
together previously on research projects, assessing 
the capacities and knowledge of civilians before, 
during, and after bombing incidents. From the start of 
this CPUS project, we understood that supervision 
and support to researchers on the ground would be 
a challenge and that Afaq and NPA had strong and 
established mechanisms already in place to allow for 
monitoring activities and a coordination structure that 
factored in the obstacles associated with working with 
remote supervision in an environment characterised 
by such massive insecurity. At the initial planning 
workshop in Gaziantep, the three partners jointly 
developed the survey and interview questions and 
designed the research framework to accommodate 
as much as possible the difficulties we expected to 
encounter. Contributions from Afaq were particularly 
relevant given that most of their staff are based in Syria, 
and consequently they have much more detailed and 
up-to-date information about the conflict situation and 
how best to respond to various changes on the ground. 
For example, they were adamant that respondents 
would feel uncomfortable if they were requested to give 
written consent, or even to receive printed copies of the 
Participant Information Sheet, which could potentially be 
incriminating. Therefore, no signatures were requested 
from respondents.
The researchers used digital survey software – when 
research staff uploaded their survey data, the software 
recorded their location so we could check if they were in 
the location they said they were when doing interviews. 
As with any data gathered directly from human subjects, 
we take at face value their responses and proceeded 
with the assumption that people are providing 
honest replies. 
Any use of an ellipsis (…) in this working paper refers 
to redundant or extraneous information that is not 
required in the quotation, or where nothing is lost in the 
meaning by removing some words from the translated 
English. Words that have been inserted for ease of 
comprehension are marked with [ ]. We were not 
able to make audio recordings of any of the interviews 
for security reasons. All quotations from interviews 
and focus groups, and researcher observations, are 
referenced afterwards.
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3 
Findings
3.1 Collective quantifiable 
data from the surveys
The 529 surveys were carried out using survey software 
on hand-held tablets and the answers uploaded 
regularly onto an online database, avoiding the need for 
paper. The survey results below do not always total 529 
as some respondents provided more than one answer.
Our team also carried out interviews with key individuals 
from these agencies, most lasting between 30 and 60 
minutes, and often under challenging circumstances. 
Focus group sessions tended to last at least two hours, 
with different participants attending at different times. 
All the respondents were informed that the questions 
related only to first response and protection activities, 
and not to any other working duties. However, it is 
clear that some of the responses, particular from the 
interviews, relate to wider professional duties beyond 
first response activities.
Two thirds of the survey respondents are in Aleppo, 
with only a very small number from Darayya or Madaya. 
Nearly one third are volunteers, and mostly young, 
with 77 per cent aged 35 or under. Over half claim to 
have at least three years’ experience in first response. 
The overwhelming majority are men – 86 per cent 
of respondents. Educational attainments are quite 
high – 73 per cent have completed high school, and 
37 per cent have a degree. Only 9 per cent have not 
finished schooling.
This demographic data is not necessarily indicative 
of wider numbers of stakeholders involved in first 
response. Without being able to ensure representative 
sampling, these numbers may only reflect the 
respondents that our teams were able to physically 
access, and should therefore not be taken as 
representative of first responders across the country. 
For example, the higher number of respondents from 
LNGOs does not indicate that they are more numerous 
than civil defence, only that our researchers were able to 
survey more of them.
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NuMBER oF suRvEy 
REspoNDENts (N)
%
Urban area Aleppo 355 67.1
Eastern Ghouta 161 30.4
Madaya 10 1.9
Darayya 3 0.6
Total 529 100.0
Paid or voluntary Paid 368 69.6
Voluntary 161 30.4
Total 529 100.0
Gender Male 455 86.0
Female 74 14.0
Total 529 100.0
Age 18-23 107 20.2
24-29 141 26.7
30-35 161 30.4
36-44 64 12.1
45 or over 56 10.6
Total 529 100.0
Years of experience in 
first response work
Less than 6 months 14 2.6
6 – 12 months 49 9.3
1 – 2 years 191 36.1
3 – 5 years 201 38.0
Over 5 years 71 13.4
Total 526 99.4
Type of organisation Local NGOs 131 24.8
Medical providers 104 19.7
Civil defence (White Helmets) 101 19.1
Opposition first responders 92 17.4
Local government councils 80 15.1
Police 21 4.0
Total 529 100.0
Education Unfinished education 47 8.9
Elementary school 97 18.3
High school 189 35.7
University degree 167 31.6
Master’s degree or higher 29 5.5
Total 529 100.0
Table 1: Survey respondents’ basic demographic data (all six groups)
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In terms of training received, the medical workers rated 
their preparation the highest, followed by the staff from 
LNGOs. Most pertinently perhaps, half of the civil 
defence respondents claimed to have received only 
a “little training”. Only two individuals from the civil 
defence and local councils report “excellent training”. 
Overall, 51 per cent report “some training but not 
enough” or less; and 49 per cent report “adequate 
training” or better. 
Table 2: Please rate the training and preparation you have received for your role
WoRkiNg 
FoR
0-
No 
tRAiNiNg
1-
LittLE 
tRAiNiNg
2-
soME 
tRAiNiNg 
But Not 
ENough
3-
ADEquAtE 
tRAiNiNg
4-
gooD 
tRAiNiNg
5-
ExcELLENt 
tRAiNiNg
totALs
Local 
councils
13 16 13 17 19 2 80
Civil 
defence
4 50 17 19 9 2 101
Opposition 
first 
responders
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Police 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Medical 
providers
10 11 17 22 22 22 104
LNGOs 9 23 29 33 27 10 131
TOTAL 36 100 76 91 77 36 416
% 9% 24% 18% 22% 19% 9%
(This question was not asked to opposition first responders or free police).
Civilian proteCtion in urban sieges | CapaCities and praCtiCes of first responders in syria
20     www.iied.org
A high number of respondents reported being placed in 
physical danger in their role “very often”, rising to 80 per 
cent for the civil defence. The second most at risk group 
are the medical staff, 83 per cent of whom stated they 
are in physical danger very often or often. The reported 
levels of physical risk in the line of work for local councils 
and LNGOs are also high, and low for the free police. 
This question relates only to perceptions of danger and 
is of course not an objective measurement. (One lucky 
individual was apparently “never” in physical danger).
Medical staff stated: “Bombing is the first challenge 
that we face, especially it occurs often in the area 
surrounding the [health] centre. The area surrounding 
the centre has been destroyed” (Doctor 10) and “Our 
old centre was destroyed and we are grateful that when 
we were in the basement when it was bombed. Our 
current centre is slightly safer than the old one” and 
“the lack… of transport… forces us to walk to [health] 
centre under very risky conditions” (Doctor 10).
“Bombing has become part of our daily 
routine” (Doctor 1).
“In Aleppo city you cannot protect yourself 
from any risk” (Local NGO 10).
Table 3: How often in your role are you placed in physical danger? 
WoRkiNg FoR:- A.
vERy 
oFtEN
B.
oFtEN
c.
soMEtiMEs
D.
RARELy
E.
NEvER
totALs
Local council 19 41 17 2 0 79
Civil defence 80 15 6 0 0 101
Opposition first 
responders
44 30 17 1 0 92
Police 9 11 0 0 0 20
Medical providers 60 25 13 4 0 102
LNGOs 7 40 73 10 1 131
TOTAL 219 162 126 17 1 525
% 42% 31% 24% 3% 0%
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The civil defence had a very high opinion of their 
organisation’s capacities, which did not resonate with 
their requests elsewhere for an urgent need for more 
training. Over half the local council staff said they didn’t 
have enough capacity. None of the medical providers 
reported “very much” capacity. Overall, 58 per cent 
of all respondents stated “not enough”, “not at all”, or 
“don’t know”.
The White Helmets mentioned: “We suffer from a lack 
of rapid response to the requirements of the… sector” 
(Civil defence 3 Eastern Ghouta) and “[we] require 
additional muscle effort to lift the debris and pull the 
civilians with their hands” (Discussion group, civil 
defence 1). 
From the medical respondents: “[We need] building 
the capacity of our staff due to lack of medical doctors 
in Aleppo which forces us to rely on nursing staff and 
unspecialised staff” (Doctor 1) and “When Aleppo 
became under siege, medical staff left Aleppo. Only 
those with conscience have stayed. Now the city is 
under siege and we are suffering from the lack of 
specialised doctors” (Doctor 3).
Contrast this with “Most nurses in the hospital have 
been practicing this career since the beginning of the 
revolution so now they have a considerable experience 
in surgery and dealing with cases of amputations” 
(Doctors 3, Eastern Ghouta).
From a LNGO member: “… the capacity building for the 
team of the organisation is the sector that always needs 
to be developed… [there is] lack of clarity in the job 
description and the responsibilities of each employee” 
(Local NGO, FGD 1) and “… we need to apply the 
good governance and management… also openness 
and transparency at work.”
“Most of the staff are volunteers… [who] work 
without salaries and there isn’t life insurance” (Civil 
defence 1, Madaya).
Table 4: Does your organisation have enough capacity to fulfil its duties?
WoRkiNg FoR: A.
vERy 
Much
B.
ADEquAtE
c.
Not 
ENough
D.
Not At 
ALL
E.
DoN’t 
kNoW
totALs
Local councils 0 23 41 11 4 79
Civil defence 47 24 23 4 1 99
Opposition first responders 0 18 31 3 36 88
Police 0 6 11 4 0 21
Medical providers 0 54 35 3 6 98
LNGOs 2 42 65 11 3 123
TOTAL 49 167 206 36 50 508
% 10% 33% 41% 7% 10%
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Table 5: Which types of national and international actors support your organisation?
WoRkiNg 
FoR:
A.
uN 
AgENciEs
B.
iNtERNAtioNAL 
DoNoRs
c.
iNgos
D.
LNgos
E.
sELF-
FuNDED
F.
DoN’t 
kNoW
totALs
Local council 2 14 46 35 14 16 127
Civil defence 36 45 50 38 16 9 194
Opposition first 
responders
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Police 0 2 3 6 4 10 25
Medical 
providers
4 24 60 27 13 21 149
LNGOs 2 16 55 74 20 22 189
TOTAL 44 101 214 180 67 78 684
% 6% 15% 31% 26% 10% 11%
(Opposition first responders were not asked this question).
Our respondents generally did not have a clear idea of 
what external support they received, and where it came 
from (40 per cent of the free police answered “don’t 
know”). There may also be overlaps between INGOs, 
international donors or UN agencies. There are security 
implications regarding international support, and 
some donors prefer to stay low profile or anonymous. 
Overall, 36 per cent claimed to be supported by 
LNGOs or self-funded. The survey results contrast with 
the interview data, which tends to be more critical of 
international agencies:
“We are in besieged area and isolated from the 
whole world” (Civil defence 1, Madaya).
“Everyone leaves us suffering alone so it is the time 
to say it is enough, we are human beings, this war 
and siege isn’t fair at all” (Civil defence 1, Madaya).
“… bombing is continuing non-stop… Syrian people 
no longer has trust in anyone… We do not trust the 
international community” (Local council 3).
“There is no local and international support. In fact, 
our local council suffers -like other councils do- from 
the lack of support, except for some financial support 
from local bodies” (Local council, Al-Shifuniyah).
“There is no real international body that supports us” 
(Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
However, one doctor states “Most the support that the 
hospital gets is from charities working in our area or in 
the Arab Gulf states” (Doctors 3, Eastern Ghouta).
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These are extremely interesting results. At the level 
of 5 (‘very much’), security threats are rated less of a 
challenge than lack of electricity and water, which are 
daily hindrances. “Lack of equipment” has high ratings 
at 3 and 4, but not as many level 5 answers (‘very 
much’) as we expected. For level 4 answers, the top 
three responses are lack of equipment, lack of funds, 
security threats and low pay. 
Staff turnover, rumours, lack of human resources and 
lack of information about the conflict are generally not 
seen as particular challenges, indicating that increased 
staff numbers would not necessarily improve outcomes 
and that propaganda and ‘fake news’ are not significant 
issues. The perceptions of human resource needs 
contrast with other feedback specifically mentioning 
the shortages of trained staff. Lack of coordination 
also seems to be rated low, given the challenges 
respondents discussed in this area, both within and 
across agencies (see Table 7).
Table 6: How much do the following challenges affect you?
pLEAsE RAtE FRoM 0 
(Not At ALL) to 5 (vERy 
Much)
5
vERy 
Much
4 3 2 1 0
Not At 
ALL
totALs
Lack of training 26 69 164 112 90 68 529
Lack of coordination 30 61 131 124 128 55 529
Rumour/gossip 29 55 145 105 126 69 529
Lack of accurate information 16 63 153 109 136 52 529
Electricity shortage 282 65 105 45 27 5 529
Water shortage 263 77 88 57 38 6 529
Lack of equipment 68 146 213 67 29 6 529
Lack of funds 76 138 180 79 44 12 529
Lack of human resources 35 83 151 94 109 57 529
Lack of access 28 85 192 116 86 22 529
Security threats 115 153 131 66 49 15 529
Staff turnover 20 67 121 81 152 88 529
Low pay 64 133 142 114 60 16 529
TOTALS 1052 1199 1919 1171 1075 471 6887
% 15% 17% 28% 17% 16% 7%
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The results from this survey question appear confusing. 
There is no clear correlation between which groups 
claim to coordinate together. Two sets of groups 
that appear to have the highest levels of inter-agency 
coordination are the local councils and the LNGOs, 
and not the civil defence. The civil defence report 
coordinating most with the local councils, and then 
with the medical providers. However, the medical 
providers report low levels of coordination with the civil 
defence, and higher levels of coordination with LNGOs. 
The LNGOs themselves report highest coordination 
levels with local councils, and low levels with all the 
other groups. From all this, we can assume that many 
respondents do not have a good knowledge of which 
groups coordinate closely, and which have weaker 
coordination mechanisms. This points to a clear need 
for better awareness of which agencies coordinate, how 
they do this, and the implications of such inter-agency 
coordination for their staff. 
Then some open-ended questions followed, and 
consequently the number of responses varied. These 
questions are broken down into six sets of respondents. 
Table 7: Which other local organisation or groups do you coordinate with?
WoRkiNg 
FoR:
A. 
LocAL 
couNciL
B. 
civiL 
DEFENcE
c. 
oppositioN 
FiRst 
REspoNDERs
D. poLicE E.
MEDicAL 
pRoviDERs
F. LNgos
Local council 69 18 14 13 16 50
Civil defence 74 32 34 24 41 8
Opposition first 
responders
19 46 89 49 28 9
Police 12 19 16 19 5 6
Medical 
providers
20 12 2 5 87 60
LNGOs 61 7 9 8 13 128
Totals 255 134 164 118 190 261
(When referring to coordination with other offices of the same organisation, the answers are marked in green). 
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3.1.1 Perceptions of what civilians can do to protect themselves
The most common answer by LNGOs is “nothing”, followed by “go to shelter” and “avoid gatherings”. In 
contrast to the advice to build or go to shelter, six respondents suggested staying at home during an attack. 
Only six recommended following civil defence procedures.
Figure 1: What can civilians do to protect themselves? (LNGOs)
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The responses from the free police show less fatalism, and more constructive answers. “Prepare a shelter” 
and “cooperate with authorities” were more popular responses than all the other responses combined. 
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Figure 2: What can civilians do to protect themselves? (Police)
Prepare a shelter
Cooperation with the competent authorities
Take caution
First aid training
Cooperation between people
Nothing
Stay at home during attack
Learn how to act during attack
Not to listen to rumours
7
5
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 3: What can civilians do to protect themselves? (Local councils)
Responses from the local councils are similar to the LNGOs, with “go to shelter” and “avoid gatherings” 
as the top two answers. However, nine say “nothing”, and three suggest staying at home. Only two people 
suggest following civil defence procedures.
IIED WorkIng papEr
   www.iied.org     27
The top two responses from the opposition groups contradict each other. Also, six say “nothing”, and six 
suggest “immigrating”. Seven recommend staying away from front lines, while three recommend the exact 
opposite. None of them mention the civil defence. These responses indicate lack of accurate knowledge 
about suitable civilian behaviour during bombardment.
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Figure 4: What can civilians do to protect themselves? (Opposition first responders)
Equal numbers (30) of medical staff advise going to a shelter, and doing nothing. In contrast, six suggest 
staying at home. Encouragingly, ten recommend following civil defence procedures. 
Figure 5: What can civilians do to protect themselves? (Medical providers)
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The most popular answer here is for civilians to follow civil defence safety procedures. However, it is less 
clear how much civilians understand these, and what communication methods exist for them to become 
more aware of them. Obviously the recommendation to go to a shelter is only valid if a nearby shelter 
exists. It is disconcerting to see from the White Helmets, three responses saying “nothing” and 13 saying 
“don’t know”. 
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Figure 6: What can civilians do to protect themselves? (Civil defence)
Among actors who have received no training on 
protection, there is a widespread view that civilians can 
do nothing to protect themselves. This acceptance is 
found more among the local council staff and opposition 
forces, and less among trained individuals like the White 
Helmets.
“As civil defence forces, we placed a warning system 
in every neighbourhood to warn civilians, hence the 
best they can do is to seek refuge” (Civil defence 2).
“… even underground floors cannot provide the 
needed protection… The only thing that can protect 
civilians is stopping the bombing” (Doctor 3).
Due to massive and repeated displacements of civilians, 
many urban areas now are more densely populated, 
leading to greater pressures to accommodate people 
when hiding from bombing raids. “When these towns 
expose to a bombing, the basements and shelters 
cannot accommodate for all people” (Doctors 3).
“They need more awareness and compliance with 
safety instructions, actually most people in town are 
careless of what is going on, they often walk in the 
streets despite intensive overflights by warplanes that 
bombard the neighbouring villages and towns, and 
this exposes them to great danger” (Local council, 
Al-Shifuniya).
“First aid training, awareness about remnants of war, 
training on how to stop bleeding” (Doctor 5).
“[We need] human and administrative development 
courses constantly and that these courses take place 
in our town” (Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
Various first responders have other specific suggestions 
for civilians:
“at schools and mosques about bombardment and 
sniping… we educate them to avoid getting out of 
houses during the bombardment, to go down into the 
basement, to turn off the lights at night specially the 
houses that are exposed from snipers side and not to 
approach the mined areas” (Civil defence 1, Madaya).
“… avoid gathering, not touching strange things, to 
stay in the safe rooms” (Doctor 2, Aleppo).
“Stay away from windows and open them as… 
military airplanes in the sky, in the case of the 
bombing got close to them” [sic], and “adherence 
to safety instructions, cooperation with civil defence 
members, not to gather in the streets, stay away from 
places overcrowding and responding to the warning 
sirens… [read] publications of civil defence… learn 
how to handle civilians during the direct targeting, the 
invading strikes and exposure to the burning napalm” 
(FGD, civil defence 1).
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 “Going to basements and shelters… stay away from 
the exotic [the unknown]… comply with instructions 
of safety… [avoid] large crowds and gatherings… 
make markets between fortified buildings… 
responding to warning sirens” (FGD, civil defence 2).
“Most important thing is the cooperation with civil 
defence elements and follow their rules… avoid the 
streets if there was army aircraft in the sky… [people] 
should know that the aircraft waiting the chance to 
shell” (Civil defence, FGD 3). 
Other participants in the same focus group: 
“Replacement of glass windows by compressed 
plastic panels to avoid the hurt from the scattered 
glass. The basement of the building should be 
equipped to hide” and “you must shut down the 
commercial market when you hear the siren you must 
stay away from the houses which was bombed, we 
ask the people not to go to the scene of the bombing 
because they may expose to bombing again” (Civil 
defence, FGD 3).
“we ask people not to go outside their homes to 
protect themselves from ground attacks… In one air 
attack one rocket destroyed the safe rooms and the 
school completely” (Local NGO, FGD 1) 
“Seek refuge… follow the early warning” (Local 
NGO, FGD 1).
“… enter shelters and basements during 
bombardment in a proper manner through the 
courses we [civil defence] conduct” (Civil defence 3). 
“follow the regulations of the civil defence, to be 
in the lower floors and safe rooms, not to gather in 
the streets because airplanes target the gatherings” 
(Doctor 10).
“the owners of these apartments have no objection in 
receiving their neighbours in case of heavy shelling” 
(Local council, Al-Shifuniyah) “pull the water of 
basements in order to be ready for the civilians in 
shelling”.
“store more essential food supplies to last 3 
months… Unfortunately, people do not have enough 
money to buy… traders are taking advantage… and 
have increased prices” ( Local council 3).
One opposition fighter advises “Running to air raid 
shelters” (Opposition 4).
One respondent from Al-Marj Hospital in the Eastern 
Ghouta had several specific recommendations for 
civilians: 
“We advise people to… prepare individual pits near 
their homes… in case of exposure to the bombing. 
We also advise to put layers of soil bags in front of 
their shops’ doors, to prevent parking near each other 
in large numbers, and not to open the markets in 
very early hour of the day because reconnaissance 
aircraft… sends the coordinates to the artillery and 
military airport that later target… these gatherings.”
One respondent spoke about the drawbacks of too 
many risk awareness campaigns for civilians: 
“people do not stop to read the awareness leaflets, 
or they do not trust the leaflets because they are 
not practical in situations like Aleppo, people do not 
care about these issues.” Instead, he recommends 
“a group of people from different sectors of the city 
who are in touch with the observatory of Aleppo… to 
distribute the information… in case there are planes 
coming to attack the city. The other way is to warn the 
people after the first attack… to go to the safe rooms 
until the end of the attacks which reduce the number 
of casualties” (Local NGO 2).
One participant (Civil defence 3) reports “[we have] 
difficulty of dealing with civilians who do not follow 
rules”. This may relate to sensory overload, whereby 
civilians understandably become inured to daily hazards 
and stop taking the necessary precautions due to 
despondency and fatalism, which compounds the 
difficulties facing first responders who require people to 
follow instructions and procedures. 
However, other respondents appear to have completely 
given up hope:
“After long experience of… air attacks for five years I 
gave up; I do not think that there is a way to protect 
yourself. I witnessed that when I was transferring 
children from front rooms to the back rooms during 
the air attacks knowing that the rockets will destroy 
the house completely” (Local NGO 9). 
“All that civilians can do is hide in cellars” (Doctor 1).
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“very difficult to talk about protecting civilians from 
bombardment and you live in the Eastern Ghouta 
where buildings are not equipped with safety factors 
of the bomb like shelters and basements… We can 
help the civilians by educating them to stay away from 
strange objects and mines; especially in the conflict 
areas since our town has some nearby lands and 
opposite of points of conflict. We encourage people 
to take caution from approaching the points of conflict 
in order not to expose their lives to danger” (Local 
council 1, Ein Tarma).
 “They cannot do anything…. What threatens civilians 
at the moment is something they cannot do much 
about and they need international protection to stop 
it” (Doctor 4).
“Nothing can protect us. When the barrels are 
thrown on buildings, they are destroyed completely. 
It can reach up to three underground floors. So 
even underground floors cannot provide the needed 
protection in this case. The only thing that can protect 
civilians is stopping the bombing” (Doctor 3).
Overall, the data from the survey and interviews present 
both a high level of pessimism and inconsistencies 
about whether civilians should remain at home or flee to 
a shelter. 
The following section provides data from each of the 
six groups.
3.2 White Helmets (N= 101)
The civil defence in Syrian opposition-held areas can 
now be considered the benchmark of urban conflict first 
response and have received significant media exposure, 
especially in the last 18 months. Their claimed political 
neutrality has been questioned, but all agencies 
involved in protection have to engage with armed groups 
in opposition-held areas of Syria; it is impossible not to.
The White Helmets report the highest levels of 
international support of any of our respondents (UN 
agencies, international donors, INGOs). They also have 
good local level support from LNGOs. On the ground, 
the White Helmets coordinate most closely with local 
councils and medical professionals, and less so with 
LNGOs or police.
3.2.1 Activities of the White Helmets
The civil defence seek to take on some responsibilities 
of the state, and see themselves as having a duty to 
care for people that the regime has abandoned. They 
undertake demining and removal of UXOs, without 
sufficient training or specialisms in this field: 
“We try to maintain the safety of civilians from 
bombing or natural disasters, and help to open 
roads, remove rubble, put out fires and other acts 
that civilians cannot do alone… We evacuate the 
wounded and dead people from under the rubble and 
civilian casualties resulting from the shooting on the 
battlefronts as we open roads and remove rubble” 
(Civil defence 3, Eastern Ghouta). 
“The main challenges that we face in doing our work 
is that our teams are targeted as they go to do their 
work” (Civil defence 2). 
“The attacks do not distinguish between civilians 
and armed people and we… see our human duty to 
receive all, not to receive some and refuse others on 
the basis of their political party or whether they are 
armed or not” (Director of medical office, Masrabah). 
One particular strength of the civil defence is their 
foundation as a voluntary response to bombing of 
civilian areas. There was strong support for the ideals 
of the revolution and this impacts on how they perceive 
themselves and what risks they are willing to take: 
“the main reason of our strength that civil defence 
is established… to alleviate the suffering of the 
people… all the staff are civilians from this region 
so they help their families and people. At the 
beginning… all the staff were volunteers that brings 
them together the common destiny and the loyalty for 
their revolution that they sacrificed a lot and risked 
their life” (Civil defence 1, Madaya).
“We lack a lot of the basics and the platform for 
action and we have nothing except determination of 
surviving and helping the people”, and “… the nature 
of the work requires a person to risk himself and his 
spirit” (Discussion group, civil defence 1). “We are 
thankful that our cadres work in such a good way 
regardless of the poor equipment and tools” (Civil 
defence 2).
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Figure 7: First of three changes you would like to see from the international community to improve your work, in order of 
priority (civil defence)
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“[The] workplace… is not valid for use in terms of 
safety, heating and lighting. But obviously, it has the 
spirit of activity and determination by the staff of civil 
defence [who] rely on primitive tools and materials 
such as maintenance devices and digging and lift of 
rubble… the work is based on the manual effort and 
energy” (CPUS researcher impressions from Madaya 
civil defence office).
The White Helmets first response activities cover S&R, 
rubble clearance and medical triage, but 
“We also document the names and numbers of 
deaths whether they are civilian or military people. 
Sometimes there are unidentified… because of the 
incident they have had… so we take pictures of them 
from several sides of the body like distinguishing 
marks, colour of clothes… to be recognised by their 
families later” 
and 
“While we rush to the area that has been bombed 
and do our usual evacuation of the injured people, lift 
the rubble or putting out fires, the regime forces target 
us directly with dozens of artillery shells to prevent 
us to help civilians… Sometimes the battlefronts are 
burning and barbaric bombardment lasts for several 
days or weeks” (Civil defence 3, Eastern Ghouta).
The civil defence also carry out dead body burials, as 
civilians may be targeted when they undertake this. 
Cemeteries tend to be exposed to gunfire. 
“People went to bury corpse one of civilians when 
they suddenly have been under the fire of Syrian 
regime consequently, there were one martyr and 
many wounded people, our team decided to do this 
job [burials] to avoid repetition of this incident” (Civil 
defence 1, Madaya).
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Figure 8: Second priority (civil defence)
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The willingness to take risks and self-sacrifice is a key 
factor in the civil defence work and forms a central 
part of their professional identity. It is possible that the 
revolutionary spirit of the opposition against Assad 
provides sufficient impetus for the formation of an 
organisation with such motivated members. There is 
also an element of machoism and disregard of personal 
danger. Religious faith may play a role in overcoming 
fear and merits further investigation. It was suggested 
at the end-of-project workshop that one reason for the 
absence of White Helmet units or similar agencies in 
Yemen and other conflicts, is that the people there do 
not share to the same extent the revolutionary aspects 
of struggle and so feel less empowered and less willing 
to take risks for other civilians. There are surely other 
causal factors at work. It is certainly a relevant topic 
for further research- why the Syrian civil war led to the 
emergence of the White Helmets, but no similar group 
emerged in other recent urban conflicts. 
Figure 9: Third priority (civil defence)
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3.3 Medical professionals 
(N=104)
“Syria is the most dangerous place in the world to be a 
doctor” (Center for Public Health and Human Rights of 
the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 
and the Syrian American Medical Society, 2015: 9).
The medical professionals are the mostly highly 
educated of all the respondent groups, but suggest 
their general medical training has not been sufficient for 
the particular challenges of urban battlefield healthcare.
Health centres are able to provide free treatment for 
some patients and some illnesses: 
“[Our] free Pharmacy section which issues more 
than 700 types of medicine to the patients free of 
charge…. we offer the free medicine, psychological 
services and milk for children.. If one of the [other] 
centres can provide the service, we transfer the 
patient to them. If not we coordinate with the armed 
political parties to send them [elsewhere]” (Director 
of medical office, Masrabah).
3.3.1 Medical challenges:
Many medical providers report a lack of facilities for 
operations and surgeries. One medical centre seeks 
to open facilities for autistic children, but it is not clear 
if this also refers to traumatised children. There are 
widespread shortages of different types of medicines, 
especially neurological and chronic disease medicines. 
Many of the security challenges are of course common 
to all civilian protection actors. In addition to this, 
significant challenges seem to be lack of human 
resources, and unfamiliar medical scenarios:
 “The biggest challenge is the lack of the specialist 
doctors especially paediatric doctors” and “… it is 
very difficult to obtain the fuel which forced us to stop 
the electric generators” (Doctor 10).
“We witness new diseases on a daily basis that never 
existed before, especially skins and gastrointestinal 
diseases. These are causes by the proliferation of 
dead bodies and rodents and drinking unpasteurised 
groundwater” and what “… we need most in freed 
areas is vaccines for babies against chronic diseases 
and neurological diseases.” (Doctor 4).
Women at one focus group report: 
“the challenge is the difficulty in transportation from 
home to the work place because the road is heavily 
targeted, in addition we go to visit the families of the 
orphans and there is risk in this” (FGD 2, Masrat).
“… these days we have found even the bread 
impossible to obtain for the patients and there is no 
vegetables in the markets. Then what can we offer to 
the patients?” (Doctor 2, Aleppo).
One CPUS researcher records that a hospital in Aleppo 
“is a small old building in Arabic style -very 
dangerous… equipment is very simple and primary, 
this equipment consists of pressure device, sugar 
test device, spray device in addition to sanitisers, 
bandages, and cotton” (CPUS researcher 
impressions).
Unlike the civil defence whose entire work experience 
has been developed under siege conditions, the 
medical professionals have been forced to adapt their 
work and operate under extremely different conditions 
from those under which they trained, with vastly reduced 
resources, equipment and medicines.
There is no clear consensus on what medicines are 
most needed, and this depends on the specific hospital 
needs. Regarding low-cost tools, various medical staff 
request the following: blood pressure measurement 
tools; sprayers; blood sugar measuring tools, sanitisers, 
bandages and cotton, Povidone, antiseptic and needles.
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Figure 10: First of three changes you would like to see from the international community to improve your work, in order of 
priority (medical providers)
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Figure 11: Second priority (medical providers)
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Figure 12: Third priority (medical providers)
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3.4 Free Syrian Police
The police appear to be the weakest agency involved 
in civilian protection. They have a less clear perception 
of any protection duties, they receive less training and 
guidance, and are often overlooked when it comes 
to first response capabilities and coordination. They 
appear to lack motivation, interact less with other 
groups, and report little external support. 
(We have included only the first set of changes that 
the police would like to see from the international 
community).
Their first suggestion is to consider the police as a civil 
institution, showing their request for greater legitimacy 
and reputation. One recommendation from our 
investigation is that the police should be enlisted as a 
major organisation undertaking protection activities, and 
receive increased training, information, and operational 
guidance. They also highlight the importance of sporting 
activities to promote team building and reduce stress.
Figure 13: First of three changes you would like to see from the international community to improve your work, in order of 
priority (police)
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3.5 Local government 
councils (N=80)
Governance in general in the opposition-held areas is a 
huge challenge, beyond first response activities:
“The local council, like other local councils, appoints 
its members by election and without conditions… 
we ask to change the method of selecting the 
council members and to appoint the office managers 
according to specialisation and certificate” (Local 
council Al-Shifuniyah). 
The current method of recruiting members does not 
seem to be rigorous enough and allows inefficient 
people to be appointed. Our CPUS researcher noted 
for one local council that 
“some civilians are dissatisfied with the current 
council members and they accuse them of theft 
because they always hide their financial records”.
“The popular market and schools in the main street 
of the town are bombed frequently, which hinders 
the movement of citizens and their security and even 
school students have been deprived… result of the 
bombing that destroyed schools in the town almost 
completely, which was equipped and prepared to 
teach” (Local council 1).
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Figure 14: First of three changes you would like to see from the international community to improve your work, in order of 
priority (local councils)
Interim (opposition) government authorities are in a 
stronger position than most organisations to promote 
civilian protection issues in public spaces, and they 
could take a more prominent role in this, with support 
from the White Helmets. 
The local council staffs’ primary set of requests are all 
constructive, rather than saying they want ‘nothing’ from 
the international community. 
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Figure 15: Second priority (local councils)
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Figure 16: Third priority (local councils)
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3.6 Opposition first 
responders (N=92)
Opposition first responders’ involvement in civilian 
protection is not their primary focus, but they do 
undertake first response activities. One consideration 
that emerges from this work is that the dichotomy 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ rebels is unhelpful. They claim 
not to receive any external support or funding, or any 
training in first response or protection issues. Of all the 
first responder groups we examined, the opposition 
forces are understandably the least cooperative and 
most belligerent: “We only receive local support. We 
receive no international support” (Opposition 5).
As armed opposition groups generally have no specific 
mandate and follow no established regulations, they 
operate with impunity and when responding to bombing 
of civilians do not coordinate much with professional 
first responders. While their modus operandi remains 
opaque, they undertake unexpected acts that appear 
to sit uneasily with their armed activities. Perhaps their 
activities that could be classed as ‘humanitarian’ are 
aimed more at establishing legitimacy and popular 
support locally, rather than from first response ideals.
“The fodder store… is the biggest store in 
Damascus… rebels controlled the store at the 
beginning of the revolution and sold its contents 
and gave the money to Board of Trustees who 
have distributed a large portion of the money to the 
people, in addition they built a school and medical 
dispensary… with all first aid equipment and paid 
the salaries of the medical cadres.” (Local council, 
Al-Shifuniyah).
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3.7 Local NGOs (N=131)
The LNGOs are diverse, comprising a mix of paid 
administrative and operational staff, with volunteers. 
Many were established after the conflict broke out and 
operate with support from INGOs and other LNGOs. 
Some local organisations are supported by international 
agencies, such as the World Food Programme and the 
Red Cross/Crescent. Others operate with no external 
support. The LNGOs refer to administrative challenges 
and management issues required to improve first 
response work: 
“within the liberated areas most of us do not have 
passports or recognised licenses… local organisation 
is not recognised if it is not licensed in Turkey 
because the banks do not transfer money inside 
Syria; for that we need a license… We need credits 
and accounts because through these accounts we 
cannot enter all the internal issues (Money) [sic] and 
this is the biggest challenge” (Local NGO, FGD 1).
Figure 17: First of three changes you would like to see from the international community to improve your work, in order of 
priority (LNGOs)
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Figure 18: Second priority (LNGOs)
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Figure 19: Third priority (LNGOs)
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4 
Discussion of findings
4.1 Overview
Our research findings suggest that the nature of urban 
warfare in Syria, the deliberate targeting of civilians and 
the domestic civilian protection responses, position 
this conflict at the cutting-edge of urban conflict 
humanitarianism. There is thus much to learn from 
this extremely challenging environment that should be 
contextually adapted for other conflict arenas and for the 
capacities of other local protection stakeholders.
Domestic agencies may engage in protection and 
first response work of some type, without necessarily 
perceiving themselves as doing it. First response 
provision could be improved through better coordination 
between agencies, and capacity building of other 
groups by the civil defence, who also request additional 
training. The targeting of civilians in the Syrian conflict 
by many different actors contravenes all legally binding 
protocols. There is virtually no reference to international 
humanitarian law (IHL) or human rights law among all 
our respondents, and increased awareness is unlikely 
to have much impact on the ground. For example, Afaq 
conduct IHL training for opposition groups, but as they 
report, the problem is that Assad’s regime does not 
adhere to any IHL, and so opposition groups fail to see 
why they should either.
There is clear proof of the inevitability of working with 
armed groups to coordinate first response activities, 
without which it would be impossible. This should not 
be taken as an endorsement of violent revolutionary 
groups. Indeed, many respondents expressed 
frustration both with the regime and with those groups 
fighting it, especially if they were not Syrians. There is 
widespread anger that the Syria revolutionary uprising 
against Assad’s regime has been hijacked by various 
extremist groups with different agendas, and that what 
was originally a political uprising has been co-opted by 
religious extremists and criminals.
The data shows that different first response actors have 
different and sometimes contrasting advice for civilian 
behaviour during bombardment. For example, there is no 
consensus on whether civilians should run to a shelter 
or stay at home. Likewise, stockpiling food and water 
makes less sense if one does not have access to them 
when in the shelter. 
Different agencies with varying levels of legitimacy 
and mandates have emerged in the political vacuum 
following ‘liberation’ from regime control. The local 
councils of the interim Syrian government are a good 
example, also the Union of Free Syrian Doctors, free 
police and others. Our respondents request additional 
presence and guidance from first response experts 
and improved organisational management to streamline 
their work activities. It is not clear from our data how 
limiting a factor it is to have newly-established non-
government organisations working together for a variety 
of humanitarian and emergency functions.
There appears to be better coordination between 
ambulance services and the civil defence, and between 
different hospitals and health centres, because they 
knew each other before the conflict and have the same 
professional circles and work practices: 
“… most doctors in the Eastern Ghouta work in 
many hospitals and medical points at the same 
time”, even though there is an overall shortage of 
doctors: “Because of the lack of doctors… they 
work in several hospitals and medical points 
according to a work schedule by the Unified Medical 
Office”(Doctors 3).
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Likewise, a doctor in Aleppo reports “We coordinate 
with all the hospitals in the liberated areas in order to 
transfer the patients to the organisations in the cases 
of heavy attacks to reduce the workload on the other 
hospitals… what we miss in entire liberated Aleppo 
is the specialists in neurological surgery or supplying 
the neurological medicine.” (Doctor 2, Aleppo).
[The managers] are all working hard and free of 
charge to serve the people of the town” (Local 
council, Al-Shifuniyah).
There are a variety of organisations involved in 
urban civilian protection and large discrepancies 
exist between them in terms of their organisational 
mandate, capabilities, levels of risk, expertise and 
preparation, and support received. The White Helmets 
have helped promote and mainstream the practice 
of civilian protection and influenced other groups in 
Syria. Although they are unarmed humanitarians, they 
have repeatedly been targeted in the conflict, as have 
medical staff. This is work requiring huge commitment 
and self-sacrifice.
It is clear that what constitutes first response needs 
to be approached from a broad perspective. It is 
conceptually difficult, and perhaps not very useful, for 
protection stakeholders to distinguish first response 
actions from other humanitarian services such as clean 
water provision, sanitation, education, and shelter. 
In a non-conflict environment, civil defence activities 
can be highly structured and organised, and linked to 
institutions providing security, healthcare, shelter and 
food/water. In urban siege conditions, these institutions 
are weak and under-resourced, therefore first response 
provision does not exist in a vacuum and relies for 
its efficacy on other support systems that include 
medical provision, food, clean water, coordination, and 
management.
While we advocate rolling out first response as a 
distinct arena of professionalism and humanitarian 
services in conflict (especially urban environments), 
this has to contextualised with reference to other areas 
of work that allow first response to take place. The 
visibility of the White Helmets should not diminish the 
work undertaken by other groups. For improved civilian 
protection in urban areas, we therefore recommend 
addressing the protection capabilities and functions 
of police officers, volunteers, and armed groups. One 
method to do this is to relate the instructions in legal 
frameworks and mandates with daily activities that are 
readily understood by local actors. Supply of physical 
tools and equipment are required, but also information, 
training, and standard operating procedures (SOPs), for 
improved first response.
The civil defence are the only agency specially 
established for first response, but other bodies also 
engage in a variety of protection activities, broadly 
understood. Many stakeholders, particularly the local 
council staff, are forced into a first response role due to 
the operational challenges facing their daily activities. 
Issues such as water provision, hygiene, shelters, 
and transport impact on first response actions, but 
are not counted under a narrow definition. Therefore 
we recommend embracing a broad definition of first 
response for operational purposes, but at the same 
time distinguishing first response from more general 
humanitarian services. 
Several respondents (especially the police) requested 
‘sports’ to assist their work and act as a morale-booster; 
“we need equipment for sport and training equipment 
to raise the fitness level of the cadre” (Civil defence 3, 
Eastern Ghouta) and “sports centres equipped with 
all sports equipment; it helps to training the defence 
elements.” “[We] lack of tools and sports equipment 
that helps to training” (Civil defence, FGD 3) and “lack 
of modern sports equipment… to train and strengthen 
their bodies’ muscles” (Discussion group, civil defence 
1). This sporting and fitness element deserves further 
investigation.
The research uncovers varying levels of insight, 
motivations, alignments, compliance, consistency, 
and work practices. There is weak evidence of inter-
agency collaboration or sharing information between 
different urban locations. For example, what is clearly 
best practice from a particular local council in one 
opposition area is not applied by interim governing 
bodies in another opposition area. This is likely due 
to poor communications and information-sharing 
mechanisms between different urban areas that are 
geographically distinct and separated by regime areas. 
Likewise, there are no mechanisms in place for medical 
providers’ innovative work practices implemented as a 
result of living with bombardment to be transferred to 
other health centres and other health workers. There 
appears to be no system for consolidating knowledge 
and experience, either across or within first response 
groups, even inside the same country. This points to a 
need for a coherent mechanism to share information and 
lessons learned without adding to the first responders’ 
work burden. 
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4.2 Psychological issues
Very few of our respondents mentioned the need for 
psychological support, or made reference to staff or 
victim trauma. One exception, with criticism implied, is: 
“Currently, the main focus of international 
organisations goes towards psycho-support 
programme. Unfortunately, these programmes 
have not had a significant impact, especially these 
programmes are not implemented according the 
right psycho support principles. The main principle 
of psycho support is the ability to make children 
express how they feel. But due to the current 
situation, children are not able to do that. What is 
being implemented at school is only letting children 
play and discharge without any real benefit. So what 
we would like to see is specialised doctors and 
practitioners and enough back-up” (Doctor 3).
Contrast that with: 
“the biggest challenge facing the civil defence 
elements is the psychological state and the shock, 
which they are exposing through watching their own 
hands pulling the remains of women and children, 
the elderly and the bodies from under the rubble” 
(Discussion group, civil defence 1).
“[We] had a clinic for human and social development 
but we could not continue the service… [it] was to 
provide psychological support for those in need.” 
(Doctor 4).
4.3 Water and fuel
These are massive operational challenges, and 
reflect the consumption requirements of urban 
environments. Damage to infrastructure reduces 
access and transportation. Fuel is in short supply and 
very expensive. Generators are unreliable, costly and 
need regular maintenance. For potable water, people 
often depend on natural spring water or wells. Our 
respondents indicate that repeated daily hardships like 
fuel and water shortages are a greater work challenge 
than the risk of injury or death.
“We suffer from a lack of fuel for ambulances… [and] 
the generators” (Civil defence, FGD 3).
“It is not easy to bring the fuel into the city… the 
organisation’s diesel reserve will be finished, 
and if the road closure continued the internet will 
disconnect and the communication with the donor 
will be stopped… difficulty in lighting the place, our 
laptops will stop, and the fans will stop also. The 
working environment… will be impossible” (FGD 2, 
Masrat).
“Water shortage is another challenge, we rely on 
wells” (Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
“There is no electricity, fuel, spare parts, raw materials 
or materials of construction and maintenance, such 
as cement and wood. The furnaces are completely 
destroyed, 40 per cent of the schools are out of 
service, sanitation are non-existent and the roads are 
very bad” (Civil defence 1, Madaya).
One doctor reports: “There were difficulties providing 
the patients with filtered water in the cases of water 
cuts” and “among the challenges is to provide the 
fuel… to enable the generators to function, we use 
the lights that works on batteries to offer the patients 
light” (Doctor 2, Aleppo).
4.4 Relations with the 
international community
We found very low levels of trust or expectation among 
respondents regarding the international community. 
They cite lack of donor coordination, failure of external 
actors to act appropriately, and generally weak levels 
of support. Many respondents reported feeling totally 
abandoned. A significant number of respondents from 
all six groups wanted the international community to 
“be honest”. 
Respondents tended to request international assistance 
more in terms of training opportunities than equipment. 
Many referred to a sensation of betrayal, leading them to 
reject the international community entirely and claiming 
they want nothing at all from international organisations:
“We wish to see observer delegations here and 
hope to get more support materials” (Civil defence 1, 
Madaya).
“We wish the international community to neutralise 
civilians from military conflict and securing public 
spaces like hospitals and schools” (Local council 1, 
Ein Tarma).
“… many mothers and children suffer from 
malnutrition. We ask the international community to 
cover these areas” (Doctor 1).
“We want them to hear our voice” (Doctor 3).
One medical provider stated what is needed most from 
the international community is “Anti-aircraft weapon. We 
do not need anything else” (Doctor 5).
“We do not need any support from them so long as 
they provide support to the regime” (Doctor 4).
“We do not like to ask them for anything because 
during the last 5 years they did not take a position 
against the attacks and now we are under siege… 
they did nothing” (Doctor 10).
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Some respondents referred to donors following their 
own funding priorities, rather than addressing the real 
needs and liaising with local stakeholders. Participants 
at one focus group discussion suggested that 
“… support must be according to our need… not to 
be forced by the donors to implement projects that 
the donor wants us to do. We see many projects 
repeat itself in more than one organisation as if it is 
a fashion [sic] for example, the projects of children 
protection, and women empowerment…. there are no 
donors asking us what the city needs” (Local NGO, 
FGD 1).
Another member of the same organisation provided a 
detailed critique of one main donor: 
“regarding the support we are looking for from the 
international community, we need a framework of 
complete programmes that have a long term impact, 
especially development projects that enable us 
to reach a situation of self-sustainability…. all the 
international support is connected completely with 
OCHA, as a result the role of the local organisation 
is minor because OCHA only give donations to the 
organisations that is licensed in Turkey… OCHA 
policy weakened the local organisations. When 
OCHA works through the organisations that is 
licensed in Turkey they don’t take into consideration 
the needs of the locals because they are not working 
with the local organisations that are on the ground. 
Local organisations are capable of responding to any 
problem because they are on the ground.” 
This is a highly pertinent observation, which highlights 
the drawbacks of only working through formally 
registered and licensed development partners. 
However, alternatives are also fraught with potential 
for mismanagement and corruption. The conclusion 
to be drawn from this is the urgent need to re-examine 
the whole structure of international support based on 
donors’ agendas rather than locally identified needs. 
International support needs to meet the needs of local 
actors and requirements on the ground, rather than 
local actors meeting funders’ needs. A full pivot to 
partnerships based on shared goals rather than donor-
beneficiary relations would address this. Affected 
people and local stakeholders are in a much stronger 
position to ascertain needs than international funders. 
Likewise, 
“… the people who are living the reality on the 
ground are able to give the accurate description of 
the situation, their need assessment will be more 
realistic, whether for employment level or the projects 
needed or the level of equipment needed” (Local 
NGO, FGD 1). 
“We want from the international community 
to support all operating on the humanitarian 
level institutions because our working is purely 
humanitarian” (FGD, civil defence 2).
There were repeated requests from respondents for 
the international community to allow humanitarian aid to 
enter the besieged areas and to stop bombing civilians 
and non-military targets, in particular hospitals. More 
contentious requests included forcing Assad to stop 
combat operations, lift the siege, open blocked roads 
between regime-controlled and opposition areas, and 
stop Russian involvement. 
There was agreement at the final project workshop 
that donors failing to coordinate can compound the 
work challenges for recipients. Different funders have 
different expectations, requirements and reporting 
structures, and this adds to the already heavy workload 
of protection and first response groups. Some donors 
prefer to give support anonymously. Many respondents 
were aware they get some international support, but 
were not familiar with how this functioned, or the exact 
name of the donor. Some donor names do not translate 
well, or were not accurately recorded. Our respondents 
did not know how the donors coordinate between 
themselves; whether there was any liaison between 
different international agencies of the Red Crescent/
Cross, UN agencies, bilateral donors, or INGOs. This 
gives an impression of ‘piecemeal’ support, rather than 
a consolidated and concerted international effort to 
support civilian protection, first response, and other 
humanitarian endeavours. 
4.5 First responder 
organisational strengths
Years of wartime conditions produce experienced and 
tough staff, for those who survive. Urban siege conflict 
often produces specific injury types: blasts, crushing, 
poison gas and chemical attacks, loss of limbs. 
“… the steadfastness of our staff is the main strength 
at the moment. All the services provided by the 
organisation at the moment are due to personal effort 
regardless of the bombing and the siege” (Doctor 3).
“… we depend on ourselves to secure some 
financial resources and we have an infrastructure of 
shelters that we oversee periodically and there are 
permanent awareness sessions for citizens about 
how to deal during emergency cases” (Local council, 
Al-Shifuniyah). 
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However, we were unable to gain more information 
about these “permanent awareness sessions”.
“Our strengths is the human cadre that enjoys of 
lively and determination to face all the challenges of 
siege and bombardment. We have an ambulance 
team who can carry out some primary procedures like 
transferring the wounded people to hospitals… We 
have trained young people and they are able to carry 
out nursing and first aid” (Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
“Our strong point is the continuity of work despite 
attacks on the centre when we were located at 
X area; that is why we moved to Z area. Even the 
buildings around the centre were attacked and we 
continued our work” (Doctor 10).
One civil defence unit in Eastern Ghouta (FGD, civil 
defence 2) refers to a superior level of inter-agency 
coordination: 
“The General civil defence management in Turkey 
coordinates the work of all the centres… in the 
liberated provinces. It receives support and [transfers 
to] Syria. Local authorities honoured us from time to 
time, which is moral rather than physical.” 
The Directorate of Civil Defence supervises over 30 civil 
defence centres in Damascus Province: 
“[we] work with the all the elements of a cadre of civil 
defence elements in the evacuation, fire, ambulance, 
the driver manager and artistic [sic]. We are an 
integrated team of 26 elements. We coordinate our 
tasks to save all those affected… with the hospitals 
and medics… we are integrated when… an air strike 
or artillery shell fell… everyone starts his work each 
in his section”. 
“We want all the institutions of civil society (local 
councils – relief organisations – human rights 
organisations – service offices) to coordinate the 
work with the Directorate of Civil Defence”. 
These observations point to the advantages of effective 
and consolidated multi-sectoral coordination.
Urban environments with densely populated areas have 
a greater potential for non-formal support mechanisms 
(psychological support, communicating shared 
experiences, faith-based activities, sports, and so on). 
The modalities of such coping and support mechanisms 
and how they be strengthened, is another key area of 
research for urban conflict.
4.6 Communications
“We use facilities such as Facebook, telegram 
and WhatsApp and email for communication” 
(Local council 3). 
[We need] “quicker response and better 
communication between staff and officials”, “mostly 
through social media like Facebook, WhatsApp and 
Telegram” (Local council, Al-Shifuniyah).
“We need to have good and effective coordination 
with all the internal offices in addition to strong and 
effective coordination with civil society organisations 
and other institutions working in the Eastern 
Ghouta and other besieged areas” (Local council 1, 
Ein Tarma). 
First response operational capacities could be improved 
through better communications and information sharing 
across different opposition-held provinces, but this is 
difficult and poses additional security risks: 
“… there is one media office that is responsible 
for the work of the defence team. Media people 
are responsible for… social media like Facebook, 
Twitter and Telegram. Young people… are working 
as reporters to the local and international channels” 
(Civil defence, FGD 3). 
“We need to develop the work through increasing the 
coordination with all the revolutionary activities which 
aims at reducing the suffering” (Director of Medical 
office, Masrabah).
People put themselves at additional risk to document 
the bombardment damage: 
“… the media professionals and civil defence 
scurrying to photo the bombing of warplanes and 
the impact of the destruction and killing.” (FGD, Civil 
defence 2).
4.7 Specific operational 
challenges
One local council respondent reports: 
“Shortages in human resource, destroyed 
infrastructure, shortages in technical equipment, 
inexperienced technical staff… I do work that’s not 
within my duties” (Local council 3). 
“… our teams are targeted as they go to do their 
work… If we had modern equipment, we would 
be able to get the injured quicker and far more 
efficiently… Our equipment are old” (Civil defence 2).
Physical challenges – in addition to frequent 
bombardments, physical access was often constrained 
by collapsed buildings, rubble and potholes and heavy 
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mud in the roads. “The biggest challenge we face is the 
direct targeting of the hospital by warplanes” (Doctors 
3, Eastern Ghouta). The hospital in Al-Nashabiyah in 
South Eastern Ghouta was bombed by the regime, and 
following its relocation to Al-Shifuniyah, it was bombed 
by Russian planes and three medical staff were killed. 
“… power cables that supply the hospital’s basements 
with electricity from the central generator are often cut 
because of constant bombardment by warplanes and 
artilleries” (Doctors 3, Eastern Ghouta).
Relocation following bombardment was a common 
theme: 
“We use these [local council] buildings as centres 
of civil defence, in light of the continued targeting of 
our headquarters by heavy artillery, that made our 
headquarters out of service especially after these 
headquarters are disclosed and become a target to 
bombing” (FGD, civil defence 3) 
and 
“The most important challenges we face in our work 
are the exploration plane that… targets with high 
accuracy… [an] exploration plane has observed the 
ambulance that led of targeting one of them directly 
[sic]”. 
“We have documented 32 cases of partial or total 
bombardment has happened in the civil defence 
centres in Damascus province, so we are trying to 
restore these” (FGD, civil defence 2) 
“the fire department [has] to deal with the fires that 
have posed by internationally prohibited weapons, 
specifically phosphorus bombs, and napalm… 
there are big fires but we only have simple tools 
to put them out like a car, sprayer, water and dust. 
Challenges of a shortage of materials needed to deal 
with the fire, “compound Powder” for example. We 
do not have protective clothing… [we are] suffering 
from the bombing during our evacuation mission… 
We do not have the necessary equipment to carry out 
the rapid evacuation and the process of extracting 
trapped under the rubble.” (FGD, civil defence 2).
As well as being targeted by bombing raids, 
respondents also referred to civilians’ inadequate 
preparations, despite awareness-raising efforts by 
the White Helmets: “the lack of awareness affects 
negatively all aspects of life, including the first 
response” (Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
4.8 Equipment requested
Respondents generally reported the need for training 
and guidance as more important than equipment, but 
where equipment is mentioned:
“Civil defence in general suffer from a severe 
shortage of the most basic requirements that [they]… 
need to work more effectively… As a result of the 
bombing, we have lost much of our equipment and 
the rest is worn” (Civil defence 2).
“[we need]… heavy equipment that are used for 
electricity and water projects” (Local council 3).
“We also need logistical tools to help us 
communicating with the outside like laptops, means 
of communication and satellite Internet” (Local 
council 1, Ein Tarma). 
“… bulldozers, hand held rock drill, cars, and rubble 
truck and protective helmets” (FGD civil defence 2) 
“body armour… helmets equipped with lamps” (FGD, 
civil defence 1).
[We require] “… extinguishing materials powder 
chemical compounds to treat most of the fires caused 
by bombing”  (FGD, civil defence 2) and “fabrics… for 
shrouding the dead” (FGD, civil defence 1). “Spare 
parts for ambulance… satellite communication” 
(FGD, civil defence 1).
“We need trucks, ambulances, and poker” [drills] 
(Civil defence 2). 
“We need fire engine to turn off the fire resulting from 
the shells loaded with materials such as napalm… 
we also need personal protection equipment that 
enable the elements to work without fears of burns or 
shortness of breath because of the dust caused by 
destroyed buildings” (Civil defence 3).
 From the same group: 
“We need bulldozers to open the roads to accomplish 
our work quickly… We need fragmentation machine 
to pull the people from under the rubble, we need 
external connection equipment to enable us to 
communicate” and “We need modern vans… oxygen 
generators and first aid kits”. “Modern fire trucks 
equipped with all firefighter’s materials and powerful 
electric pumps with high pressure. Fire extinguishing 
materials, powder, chemical compounds to deal with 
the subjects of napalm and phosphorus” (FGD, civil 
defence 2). 
There is a great need for defibrillators in ambulances.
There are a variety of low cost medical items that are 
easier to procure: “suction tool… to remove infected 
discharges… syringe, chemical materials, microscopes, 
slides, blood pressure monitors, tools to measure the 
level of sugar in the blood” (Doctor 10). 
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“Two Oxygen machines, three surgery tools, two 
monitors, a heart machine (ECG), internet and 
medicines” (Director of medical office, Masrabah).
“We have only 12 single beds and 5 double beds. 
They are not medical beds, but we use them because 
of the lack of medical beds” (Doctors 3, Eastern 
Ghouta). “[We] suffers greatly from the lack of 
aesthetic materials and anaesthesia needles”. 
They are forced to operate from basements below 
ground as a precautionary measure against aerial 
bombardment. 
One LNGO (Local NGO, FGD 1) points out “part 
of our projects is training… We need projector, 
photocopiers, and printers, since we have educational 
projects and the current printers are unable to do 
the work… the logistical support that we got is only 
for the funded projects. Our organisation do not 
have any special support for logistics,” referring to 
organisational overheads.
4.9 Training requested
Improved training provision was one of the main 
requests from Syrian first responders. Given the 
logistical difficulties of face-to-face training, much of 
the training delivery should be online and available 
for download. It needs to be appropriately translated 
and tailored for different levels of expertise, with 
opportunities for refresher courses, which is another 
specific recommendation from the end of project 
workshop. With the rapid emergence of new 
technologies and innovations in user-interfaces, this is a 
key area for technologists to develop apps and software 
targeted specifically for areas with weak or censored 
internet. Advances in training provision are thus likely to 
be in accessibility and interaction, rather than content. 
Questions that will need to be addressed, but which are 
beyond the scope of this paper, concern dissemination, 
monitoring of access and implementation, how best 
to incorporate on-the-ground feedback, and how to 
dovetail with existing online materials and curricula. 
Figure 20: What additional training would help you improve your work? (Civil defence)
The top three answers are search & rescue, mine clearance and extinguishing fires. Various types of 
medical training were requested, including chemical and phosphorus burns and general first aid. More 
surprisingly, there seems to be little interest in training on psychological treatments or superficial wounds.
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Figure 21: What additional training would help you improve your work? (LNGOs)
The primary set of trainings requested from the LNGO staff is impressive in terms of first response 
work- management, first aid and evacuation. 
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Figure 22: What additional training would help you improve your work? (Police)
Many respondents refer to the need for sports training, but for the police it is the first request, with first 
aid as the second request.
Sports
First aid
Emergency evacuation
Judiciary
Police
Criminal investigation 1
1
2
3
5
9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Information technology
Management
First aid
Search & rescue
Public relations
Project management
English
Video montage
Microsoft Office
Media
Human resources
First aid for chemical exposures
Communication skills
Trainings to be more practical
Strategic planning
Sphere standards
Soil science
Small projects management
Services improvement
Psychology
Programming
Post-war development
Photography
NGO management
Institutional work
First aid for phosphorus burns
Finance
Engineering software
Emergency first response
Education in conflict zones
Economy
Eco friendly projects
Conflict preparedness and protection (CPP)
Civil society leadership
Civil defence
‘Cadastral’ software
Business administration
Leadership skills
Archive skills
Advertising 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
6
11
13
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Figure 23: What additional training would help you improve your work? (Local councils) 
The main needs from the local councils are clear: specific training on information technology, organisational 
management, and first aid.
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Figure 24: What additional training would help you improve your work? (Medical providers)
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A large number of answers to this survey question 
emerged, and we include them all to illustrate the 
range of medical needs facing nurses and doctors. 
First aid for medical staff is the top request, then 
general medical and advanced nursing. Additionally, 
medical practitioners request training on battleground 
and emergency medicine (burns, chemicals, etc.) and 
aspects of medical triage.
All six groups requested training on communications 
and outreach procedures; organisational management 
and information technology, and maintenance of 
equipment and machinery, particularly specialist items. 
There exists a range of materials and information 
for civilians on self-protection behaviours to be 
followed in conflict, much of it developed by INGOs 
and emphasises the risks from explosives. For first 
response actors, the number one request that we 
found for training among all six first response groups is 
for first aid, especially how to stop bleeding, and treat 
crush injuries and gas attacks. The second is S&R 
procedures and how to coordinate rubble clearance. 
Finally the main distinct sets of training requested are 
on risk education, UXOs and explosive remnants of war 
(ERWs); evacuation and hibernation procedures and 
safe handling of explosives, fires and chemicals.
4.10 Support and 
coordination issues
There is little indication of any coordinated and 
coherent support systems. Instead, there are 
various organisations at local, national, regional, 
and international levels which provide funding and 
equipment. This support appears to be targeted at 
specific recipient groups rather than clusters of groups, 
and given on an ad hoc basis but 
“this support is limited and inadequate comparing 
with the work” (Civil defence 3). 
“There are many committees support the institution, 
but it is like any other unstable… Civil defence 
institution with… great work carried out by its 
members need international support not only 
individuals and small institutions” [sic] (FGD, 
civil defence 1).
Some first response groups receive salary boosts, 
others do not. Some groups receive funding for 
overheads; others are tied to specific projects only. 
There is little continuity or sustainability in the funding 
support, and people on the ground do not know how 
external support is coordinated and which donors 
communicate with each other. There are disagreements 
about the advantages of increasing salaries for 
first responders, but there is agreement that base 
salaries should be standardised, with additional 
compensation for high-risk positions. Respondents 
request at the minimum to actually receive their salaries 
regularly, which seems to be a greater priority than 
salary increases.
“There are several entities and bodies that try to 
support us… not enough for expenses of simple 
works (if any) because of the high prices of materials 
and services… in the besieged area totally can’t 
get anything even seeds for planting for example, 
sometimes we have to pay very huge sums to the 
Syrian regime forces to get some necessary things” 
(Civil defence 1, Madaya).
“Syrian Red Crescent entered the city twice this 
year… very few medical supplies and medicines. 
However, these substances are enough for only one 
month at most” (Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
“We do not take any money from the military patients 
and their families but we offer a list of the patients 
who received medical treatment to their military 
faction so that the medical delegate compensates 
us… for each patient” (Doctor 3, Eastern Ghoutah).
This indicates clear and sustained coordination, at least 
in financial matters, between the hospital and the armed 
opposition groups. 
“The surgeries, medical emergency and treatment 
of wounded ones in cases of direct bombardment 
are free and we do not take any money from patients 
in these cases even if the financial support stops 
entirely” (Doctor 3, Eastern Ghoutah). 
“We hope to make a development in the financial 
system such as the unification of private support 
fund from some centres. The support we get will 
be distributed equitably to all centres but the 
private support received by some centres only” 
(Civil defence 3).
Civil defence units in Eastern Ghouta “get independent 
support for each other… centres that are located in the 
middle sector get support from traders in that region, 
centres that are located in Duma always get the support 
from non-governmental organisations, and centres in 
Marg get support from relief organisations” (FGD, civil 
defence 1). This fractured system is unlikely to result in 
coherent, structured, and equitable support.
One element of support is the potential for greater 
coordination between stakeholders in different 
opposition-held areas: 
“We aspire to have a high coordinating with hospitals 
and medical offices in other liberated provinces to 
take advantage of their expertise in light of shelling 
and siege they expose to and develop ourselves with 
the benefit of their experience” (Doctor 3).
“We coordinate with all the medical councils to 
obtain the centre supplies including medicine, and 
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other medical equipment. Also we coordinate with 
the local government medical office to obtain the 
medicine, and we coordinate with the local council to 
obtain the water” (Doctor 10).
“We suffer from a big problem in the removal of 
rubble because we frankly do not have heavy 
machinery and bulldozers or any other equipment to 
lift the rubble, but we borrow them and civil defence 
helps us” (Local council 1, Ein Tarma).
One spokesperson for an LNGO reports: 
“We are not supposed to coordinate with military 
groups because we are humanitarian organisation. 
But in reality we found that it is necessary to 
coordinate with the military groups because 
sometimes they know about air attacks in some areas 
before it happened and before anyone else, so for the 
safety of our employees we need to coordinate with 
them” (Local NGO 2).
“We deal with military factions in our areas in order 
to evacuate the wounded people in ambulances in 
confrontations areas” (FGD, civil defence 2).
4.11 What the respondents 
did not discuss
Themes that our respondents did not mention are also 
noteworthy. Noticeable by their absence are references 
to the traumatic and psychological support aspects 
of first response, whether for victims or workers. It is 
clear that our respondents understand first response 
in fairly narrowly defined terms: extracting casualties 
from rubble, S&R, and medical triage. There was little 
discussion about how they manage the tactical level of 
first response: how exactly they organise S&R, what 
procedures and practices they follow, how they clear 
areas and identify cleared areas, how they facilitate 
evacuation or maintain compliance among civilians 
or other agencies. There was also very little mention 
of particularly vulnerable groups such as elderly, 
pregnant women or children and their specific needs 
in a conflict zone. We have the impression that the 
respondents treat all civilians as an amorphous group 
without disaggregating social groups (or not having the 
resources to do so). 
They did not discuss early warning in any significant 
detail, how messages are communicated to civilians, or 
how and when civilians should hibernate. Overall, the 
first responders demonstrated little overt adherence to 
any standard operating procedures (SOPs). They did 
not refer to a command structure. We did not obtain 
much insight into how they coordinate and communicate 
across groups. The overall impression is an ad hoc 
approach, characterised by enthusiasm and sacrifice 
more than regulations and operational compliance. 
There is not much evidence of first response groups 
engaging with the free police. They are not considered 
to be particularly significant by other first response 
agencies. This may be due to the fact that they did 
not exist before the conflict and have not had enough 
time to become embedded as part of civil life in 
opposition areas.
There is little or no evidence of competition or 
disagreement between different domestic first 
responders. Either all the various respondents are 
presenting a united front to the researchers, or they feel 
some strong sense of partnership and shared goals.
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5 
Recommendations
“Continued civilian suffering in conflicts 
in Syria… is a sobering reminder of the 
international community’s continued failure to 
translate legal obligations around the conduct 
of war into tangible benefits for civilians… 
Recent crises in Syria… demonstrate that local 
organisations close to the front lines, with local 
knowledge and networks, are often the most 
effective first responders.” (ODI, 2016: 2; 5).
Although the original aim of this research was not to 
critique the international community and the mainstream 
humanitarian system and its funding mechanisms, it 
emerged from our investigations as a particularly salient 
and strongly expressed element of our respondents’ 
perceptions. In a parallel way, the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) (ibid.) refers to the 
international humanitarian sector’s crisis of legitimacy 
and “asymmetrical power dynamics” and suggests it 
needs to “let go” of obsolete structures and models of 
implementation that are based on the current Western-
dominated guiding philosophy of ‘humanitarianism’. 
This entails relinquishing aspects of control and power, 
and ceding them to actors outside the mainstream 
framework of the formal humanitarian system and 
supporting them through adopting a more enabling role 
rather than direct implementation. Second, significant 
shifts are likewise required in removing obstacles to 
funding local agencies, and prioritising the needs of 
affected people over greater visibility and resource 
efficiency. Third, as we highlight in this paper, the 
concept of what constitutes ‘humanitarian’ needs to be 
broadened to be have a longer-term vision and embrace 
a wider range of partners and actors (faith groups, 
private sector, new donors etc.), while also remaining 
neutral, legitimate, and guided by IHL norms.
Within these overall recommendations that we 
share with ODI, ALNAP, and others, this paper aims 
to highlight to donors, INGOs, the IASC, and the 
humanitarian sector in general, the existing capacities 
and challenges in urban first response in Syria that 
are relevant for other urban conflict environments. 
We suggest there is a clear case for improved 
understanding of what the localisation of aid signifies 
in concrete terms in urban conflict arenas. This is 
particularly relevant for:
A)  Understanding the disparate strengths, needs, and 
challenges of a diverse group of first responders
B)  More coherent insights into the complex contexts of 
urban conflict and what this entails for coordination, 
communication, and political manoeuvring
C)  Moving away from competition between different 
[often Western] humanitarian agencies, and
D)  Embracing partnership models that favour a top-
down and supply-driven approach that retains 
the formality and professionalism of the INGO 
methodology while allowing for more programming 
flexibility based on the points above. This would 
draw on the strengths of local partners and first 
responders whilst being realistic and open about 
their weaknesses and mechanisms to support them.
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5.1 Civilian protection 
governance
A multi-stakeholder group of Syrians discussed the 
initial findings of the research with our research team 
in Gaziantep, Turkey. They suggested establishing an 
overarching ‘Crisis Unit’, comprised of representatives 
from different first response agencies, to act as 
a governing body and assist with leadership and 
coordination. Likewise, voluntary ‘Civilian Protection 
Networks’ drawn from local bodies could assist civilians 
to formally document war crimes, conflict monitoring, 
and human rights abuses, set standards, and promote 
guiding principles of first response. More attention 
could be given to promoting civilian protection and first 
response principles and practices in schools, mosques, 
and health centres.
Improved knowledge-sharing mechanisms could be 
put in place to strengthen compliance, collaboration, 
and sharing of experience and best practice, which 
would contribute significantly to improving effective 
working practices. We recommend rolling out such 
transfers of expertise within sectors. The more heavily 
populated and urban contexts offer the opportunity for 
local councils (or equivalent elected interim governance 
structures) to take the lead as ‘umbrella’ organisations 
coordinating first response between different groups: 
“The province office is considered the mother 
organisation for all local councils, it supervises and 
coordinates the work… The service office provides 
the heavy machineries and equipment that help us to 
raise the rubble, bring fresh water to the town, drill 
wells and install compressors to extract water that is 
used for only cleaning because the water of town is 
contaminated and undrinkable… The medical office 
cooperates directly with the neighbouring medical 
points and the civil defence point.” (Local council, 
Al-Shifuniyah)
Within this framework, the White Helmets or equivalent 
civil defence organisations should take the lead as first 
response specialists, training other groups and building 
local capacities. This potential role was recommended 
at the multi-stakeholder workshop in Gaziantep.
Civil defence organisations should be facilitated to 
be represented internationally to support advocacy 
and fundraising, to strengthen sustainability, and 
allow for the transfer of expertise. The police should 
be considered as a major protection stakeholder and 
provided with more training, information, and operational 
guidance. International support should be relevant, 
context-specific and adapted for different end-users. 
Each hospital in Syria could partner with an external 
supporter, who can provide medical guidance, channel 
funding, and liaise with other agencies to supply 
medicines and equipment. Medical cold storage and 
maintenance issues should be factored in.
5.2 Distinguishing 
solutions to conflict from 
first response
• Political efforts to stop civil conflict, such as 
ceasefires, negotiated settlements and mediated 
peace talks tend to receive more attention than 
mechanisms on the ground to reduce civilian 
casualties. Civilian protection strategies and 
improving the capabilities of various local actors 
should be increasingly integrated into mainstream 
humanitarian engagement and wider efforts to stop 
and reduce conflict.
• UN agencies, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), 
and the major international humanitarian organisations 
should take greater and more clearly defined 
responsibility for developing better organised and 
more strategic support mechanisms for local first 
responders, particularly in urban conflict zones that 
are inaccessible to the international community. Other 
organisations, such as the Stabilisation Unit at DFID, 
could also offer support. Programmes aiming to 
bolster the capacity of first responders could include 
the provision of a greater range of online materials for 
training and capacity building, translated and adapted 
for local contexts and audiences. These could be 
facilitated by politically neutral organisations such 
as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent or 
regional INGOs.
• Particularly in urban conflict zones that are 
inaccessible for the international community, more 
operationalised and strategic support mechanisms 
need to be developed. The localisation of aid needs to 
become mainstreamed as a guiding principle. 
• First responders should be supported to become 
more professionalised, with specific mandates for 
different groups, with operational guidelines, minimum 
capabilities and specific activities all elaborated. The 
concept should be mainstreamed that all conflict 
stakeholders have civilian protection duties, and that 
avoiding the targeting of civilians is a non-negotiable 
and binding responsibility for all. Provision of power 
and water supplies to civilian protection actors where 
possible should be a priority for fostering efficient 
working conditions.
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• First response and civilian protection activities should 
be distinguished from other humanitarian services and 
promoted to be more standardised, specialised and 
structured. Donors and humanitarian agencies should 
strengthen (remote) support to first responders, 
including non-specialist groups. Provide clear 
mandates and operational structures, linked to first 
response activities.
• To strengthen civilian protection, this paper does 
not only recommend further dissemination of 
formal frameworks and policies, but also a closer 
engagement with local perceptions, activities and 
capabilities. The debate should be widened on what 
constitutes ‘humanitarian’ response, adopt more 
inclusive mechanisms that integrate a larger set of 
protection actors, and link international norms and 
frameworks with local knowledge and practices. 
What constitutes civilian protection or first response 
activities may be only loosely understood on the 
ground, even if the concrete work practices of the civil 
defence are well known. Actors working in opposition 
areas involved in service provision of some type, 
overlapping with first response actions, are unlikely to 
have a narrow specific conception of first response 
or civilian protection and will normally refer to a wide 
range of duties and responsibilities. 
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Annexes
Annex 1: Data collection procedures
All researchers were instructed to formally introduce themselves, and explain what the project was and what it 
sought to do. They were instructed to give details about how the data would be used and what for, and the aims of 
our work. The subject could refuse to answer any question. All respondents were shown the Participant Information 
Sheet, and what consent meant for this research and why we would not take signatures, only verbal consent. The 
anonymity of the project was explained in detail and how all data was protected on Coventry University secure 
servers. All CPUS staff signed the Project Confidentiality Agreement. 
Annex 2: Key informant interview questions
 1) Main activities and duties
 2) Operational challenges in your work?
 3) Who do you coordinate with? What networks, communications channels, etc.?
 4) Who supports you (international and domestic)?
 5) What are the particular strengths of your organisation for first response?
 6) In which areas would you like to develop organisational capacity?
 7) What equipment and tools does your organisation need to function more effectively? 
 8) What changes would you like to see in your work?
 9) What support would you like to see from the international community?
10) In your professional opinion, what can civilians do to protect themselves more?
11) Any other information?
Annex 3: Focus group discussion (FGD) questions
1) Operational challenges in your work?
2) Who do you coordinate with? What networks, communications channels, etc.?
3) Who supports you (international and domestic) and what would you like to see from the international 
community? [Not for police or opposition groups]
4) In which areas would you like to develop organisational capacity?
5) What equipment and tools does your organisation need to function more effectively? 
6) What changes would you like to see in your work?
7) In your professional opinion, what can civilians do to protect themselves more?
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Annex 4: Survey questions
 1) Job title:
 2) Type of organisation? (answers from a closed list)
 3) Organisation name: 
 4)  Age: 
 5)  Gender
 6) Paid or voluntary?
 7) Years of experience in first response work? 
 8) Your qualifications: (answers from a closed list)
 9) What is your role? (answers from a closed list)
10) Which other local organisations or groups do you coordinate with?  
(answers from a closed list)
11) How much do these challenges affect you?  
(answers limited to: Lack of training, lack of coordination, rumour/gossip, lack of accurate information, 
electricity shortage, water shortage, lack of equipment, lack of funds, lack of human resources, lack of 
access, security threats, staff turnover, low pay, other)
12)  Which types of national and international actors support your organisation?  
(answers limited to: UN agencies, international donors, INGOs, LNGOs, self-funded, don’t know),  
but not for opposition first responders)
13)  Please rate the training and preparation you have received for your role:  
[not for police or opposition first responders]: 
 Answers:
0: no training
1: little training
2: some training, but not enough
3: adequate training
4: good training
5: Excellent training
14)  What additional training would help you improve your work?
15)  How often in your role are you placed in physical danger? 
 Answers:
A) Very often B) Often C) Sometimes D) Rarely E) Never
16)  Does your organisation have enough capacity to fulfil its duties during conflict? 
 Answers: 
A) Very much B) Adequate C) Not enough  
D) Not at all E) Don’t know
17) Please identify three changes you would like to see to improve your work, in order of priority: 
18) Please identify three changes you would like to see from the international community to improve 
your work, in order of priority:
19) What physical equipment is your organisation lacking to effectively operate?  
(only for first response – not weapons)
20)  What can civilians do to protect themselves more?
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Annex 5: Additional survey data findings
From Norwegian People’s Aid’s ‘Conflict Preparedness & Protection’ project which is relevant to CPUS work:  
(N= 1512), data collected in early 2016 in Aleppo.
[A lot more data available, but these graphs below are perhaps the most relevant to CPUS]
Figure A1: Who is providing initial first aid response?
Figure A2: What agencies are helping in providing communities with protection measures supplies?
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